The twenty-one demands, Japan versus China

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The
Twenty-One Demands

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA

GfZay Wood

Formerly Editor of "The Par Eastern Republic,"

Curtis Fellow in International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia

University, President of the Chinese Political Science

Association, Author of "China, the United States,;

and the Anglo- Japanese Alliance,*' etc., etc.

Lt--tiii'

N«w YoMC

Chicago

Fleming H. Revell Company

London and Edinburgh

I

Copyright, 1921, by
FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY

Books by
G. ZAY WOOD

1. China, the United States and the Anglo-
Jai>anese Alliance.

2. The Chino-Jai>anese Treaties of May 25, 1915.

3. The Twenty-one Demands.

4. China, Japan and the Shantung Question.

Printed in the United States of America

New York: 158 Fifth Avenue
Chicago: 17 North Wabash Ave
London: 21 Paternoster Square
Edinburgh: 75 Princes Street

TO

MR. LIANG-HUA SHEN

A FRIEND. COUNSELLOR, AND SYMPATHIZER

THIS BOOK IS
AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

'',

FOREWORD

What are the Twenty-one Demands? The ques-
tion has been again and again asked, with the meet-
ing in Washington of nine Powers — Great Britain,
France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium, Holland,
Portugal, and the United States — ^to discuss ques-
tions relating to limitation of armament and to the
tangled issues in the Pacific and in the Far East.
To answer this simple question, concisely and yet
fully, is the purpose of the book, which is primarily
a non-partisan and impartial discussion of the sub-

. ject.

The Twenty-one Demands are originally divided

. into Five Groups, and it is in accordance with the

7 division of Groups that they are herein analysed.

j^ These analyses, together with the account of the
immediate circumstances leading to the presentation
of the demands and of the manner in which the
negotiations were conducted between the Chinese
and Japanese Governments, ought to serve as a com-
plete story of the most dramatic and most significant
incident, if it be an incident, of the whole history of
the Chino-Japanese relations.

The facts herein presented are not new. They
have long become public property. They are, how-
ever, so arranged as to present a consecutive narra-
tive, and those who are interested to know the com-

8 FOREWORD

plete history will find it fairly comprehensive. The
readers are invited to constdt the appendices, in
which may be found the official statements and
original texts, and the companion volume, "The
Chino- Japanese Treaties of May 25, 1915," in which
the voidance of the said treaties is urged on legal,
political, economic, and moral grounds.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Introduction 11

II. The Presentation of the Demands . 22

III. Attempt at Secrecy . . . . 31

IV. The Twenty-one Demands Analysed

— Group I 39

V. The Twenty-one Demands Analysed

— Group II 46

VI. The Twenty-one Demands Analysed

— Group III 53

VII. The Twenty-one Demands Analysed

— Group IV 62

VIII. The Twenty-one Demands Analysed

— Group V . 68

IX. A Unilateral Negotiation ... 79
X. Conclusion 95

Appendices :

A. Instructions Handed at Tokio,
December 3, 1914, by Baron
Kato, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, to Mr. Hioki, Japanese
Minister in Peking, in Con-
nection WITH THE Twenty-One

Demands 105

v/B. Japan's Original Demands, Hand-
ed TO President Yuan Shih-
Kai by Mr. Hioki, January 18,
1915 108

10 CONTENTS

PAGB

C. The Incorrect Version of the
Twenty-one Demands Given
Out by the Japanese Govern-
ment TO THE Other Powers in
Response to their Inquiries . 113

^ D. Japan's Revised Demands, Twen-
ty-four IN ALL, April 26, 1915 . 115

%/ E. China's Reply to the Revised De-
mands, May 1, 1915 . . . 123
F. Memorandum Read by the Chi-
nese Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs TO Mr. Hioki, the Japa-
nese Minister, at a Conference

HELD AT WaI ChIAO Pu, MaY 1,

1915 128

sj G. Japan's Ultimatum to China, De-
livered BY THE Japanese Min-
ister TO THE Chinese Govern-
ment, 3 p. M., May 7, 1915 . . 135
^ H. China's Reply to the Ultima-
tum, May 8, 1915 .... 142
V I. Official Statement by the Chi-
nese Government Respecting

THE ChINO-JaPANESE NEGOTIA-
TIONS Brought to a Conclusion
BY China's Compliance with
THE Terms of Japan's Ultima-
tum 144

J. Japan's Communique, Issued at

ToKio, May 7, 1915 . . . 165

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

INTRODUCTION

FOR the last score of years, Japanese diplomacy
in China seems to have had as its paramount
object the control of the rich Chinese re-
sources which are necessary to a very large extent
to Japan's own economic existence. The means
adopted by Japan to realise the end she has in view
are not always above reproach, and the methods
which she employs are frequently reprehensible.
The Chientao dispute of 1907, the Tatsu Maru
affair of the following year, the objection by the
Japanese Gk)vemment to the construction of the
.Hsinmintun-Fakuman Railway in 1908-9, the col-
lapse of the neutralisation scheme of the Manchurian
railways in 1910, the conclusion by Japan of secret
agreements with Russia in 1907 and then in 1910
for the division of their respective spheres in China,
the Nanking affair of 1913, the Chengchiattm fracas
of 1916, the Amoy police case in 1918, the Hung-
chim outrage in 1920, and many other cases and
"affairs" that it is not necessary to enumerate here,
are typical examples of the means and methods which
Japan has not hesitated to employ in adjusting her

11

12 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

relations with China. They are certainly not happy
instances of fair dealing, which should characterise
all international relations, particularly between China
and Japan, when the latter has much to depend upon
the former, even if for economic considerations only.
Japan's economic and political ambitions in China
have long been an open secret. Because of the
watchfulness of the other Powers having vital in-
terests in China, they were not, however, openly
pursued. The outbreak of war in Europe in August,
1914, created for Japan an unprecedented but long
desired opportunity — "an opportunity that never
comes back again in a life time" — ^to carry out her
well-studied economic and political programmes in
China, or, to use the official language of the Japanese
Government, "to solve those various questions which
are detrimental to the intimate relations of China
and Japan with a view to solidifying the f oimdation
of cordial friendship subsisting between the two
countries to the end that the peace of the Far East
may be effectually and permanently preserved."
Thus, without waiting for the call from her ally,
Japan suggested her readiness to join in the conflict.
Apprehensive of the serious consequences which
would flow from Japan's intervention in the strug-
gle, and yet unwilling to state openly its objection
to her participation, the British Government merely
suggested that, in event of war between Japan and
Germany, the operations of the Japanese forces
should be limited to the Yellow Sea and to the pro-

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 13

tection of the allied shipping in the northern Pacific.
Japan wished, however, to play bigger stakes. So,
on August 15, 1914, Japan sent the ultimatum to
Germany, calling on the latter "to deliver on a
date not later than September 15 to the Imperial
Japanese authorities, without condition or compen-
sation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chow, with
a view to the eventual restoration of the same to
China." The ultimatum was ignored by Germany,
and war was declared by Japan on August 24. The
Chinese Government, realising that a major portion
of the military operations against the German leased
territory would be carried on in the Shantung prov-
ince, and being anxious to limit these operations to
the smallest area commensurate with the military
necessity so that her people would be subjected to
as little miseries and devastations of the armed con-
flict as possible, established a special war zone in
which the belligerents could carry on their hostile
operations against each other. The establishment
of this special military area in Shantung was noti-
fied to Japan, Germany, and the allied Powers, in
a circular note under the date of September 3, 1914.
It is very important to remember the creation of this
special military area, for its abolition later was seized
upon as an excuse justifying the presentation of the
Twenty-one Demands. It is also important to add
that to this war zone Japan vigorously objected,
for she thought that it would tend to hamper and
to limit her military operations.

14 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Japan's real object in entering the war, it has been
pointed out, was "less the destruction of German
Imperialism than the creation of a situation enabUng
her to strengthen her own position in Eastern Asia
by all means within her power." She saw in her
participation in the war the opportimity of driving
Germany out of her leased possessions in Shantung,
as Japan had done so with Russia in South Man-
churia. Dispossession of Germany would eventually
mean acquisition by Japan, is apparently the assump-
tion upon which Japanese statesmen had formulated
their Chinese policy. The rich coal, iron, and gold
mines which German concerns had operated in Shan-
tung, the Tsinanf u-Kiaochow Railway that had been
built with Chino-Japanese capital and operated by a
private company, and other fruits of German enter-
prise in Shanttmg, were so many more attractions
for Japan to make use of the opportunity which her
participation in the war afforded her. Towards the
later part of September, Japan began her military
operations against Tsingtao, in co-operation with a
contingent of British forces. On November 7, the
Germans capitulated, and on November 16, the
Anglo-Japanese forces made their triumphant entry.
The war in the Far East, which was precipitated by
Japan's ultimatum of August 15, was practically
over by the middle of November. The British forces
were immediately withdrawn ; but Japan, for obvious
reasons, not only refused to withdraw her troops
already in Shantung, but increased her forces

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA IS

there even after the cessation of military opera-
tions.

As the war zone was created by the Chinese Gov-
ernment to meet the commencement of the military
operations by Japan and Great Britain against
Tsingtao, it became absolutely useless with the cap-
ture of the territory and the general cessation of
military activities in the area. The Chinese Govern-
ment expressed, therefore, the desire to abolish this
military zone, so as to restore the normal condition
in the province as soon as possible. The Chinese
Government had, at first, even entertained the hope
that the Japanese Government would take the initia-
tive in suggesting its abolition. It is, however, very
curious to say that the Japanese Government, when
approached on the subject, objected to the abolition
of the war zone, as strongly as it had objected to its
creation at the beginning. The official attitude of the
Japanese Government seemed to be that, inasmuch
as China had already established the zone there was
no need for its immediate abolition.

The Chinese Government became all the more de-
termined to abolish the special military area, in view
of the persistent disregard shown by the Japanese
authorities of China's territorial sovereignty. Re-
gardless of the feelings of the Chinese people in gen-
eral and those of Shantung in particular, and quite
unmindful of China's sovereign rights, the Japanese
military authorities in command of the expeditionary
forces proceeded systematically to establish their

16 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

jurisdiction in the cities which they had already oc-
cupied, and to extend it to the other cities, which are
outside of the military zone. In other words, they
proceeded to establish their jurisdiction practically
all over the Shantung province. A contemporary
writer recorded the encroachments as follows : "Gar-
risons were stationed along the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao
Railway, and at Tsinanfu, the capital of the prov-
ince; at Lungkow, Wd-hsien, and other important
points. By a gradual and at times subtle process,
Chinese police, communication and other local ad-
ministrative functions were negatived and usurped,
after the system which had been employed and per-
fected in Korea and Manchuria. An influx of a low
class of Japanese immigrants, to which the Chinese
population was more or less subordinated, followed
on the heels of the Japanese military forces." And
the special war zone, the creation of which was
strenuously objected to by Japan as she thought it
would limit the area of her military operations, was
now secretly welcomed by the Japanese authorities
as a convenient screen to cover up their sinister
activities.

That the war zone could be made use of by Japan
in such a way was beyond the calculations of the
Chinese Government. We recall that when Japan
landed her troops at Lungkow and thus violated
China's neutrality, the Council of State (the Tsang-
chengyuen) protested to the Peking Government and
urged it for definite action; we know that when

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 17

Japanese authorities seized the Shantung Railway
under the pretext of "military necessity," the Coim-
cil of State, jealous of China's territorial rights,
again protested and again urged that something
should be done to prevent further aggression; and
we also know that when Japan insisted upon the
maintenance of the special war zone when the war
operations had ceased, the Council of State called
upon the Peking Government to abolish it without
reference to the wishes of the Japanese Government.
The public opinion in China was, then, so decidedly
against the continuance of the special military area,
and the Chinese people in general were so afraid of
its being made use of by Japan as an easy device
with which to carry out her schemes of exploitation
and aggression in the Shantung province, that the
Chinese Government was boimd to protest against
the sinister use which the Japanese military author-
ities were making of the zone, and to request the
concurrence of the Japanese Government to its im-
mediate abolition. In the last of a series of six notes
exchanged between the two governments, the
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out
that two full months "have elapsed since the capture
of Tsingtao ; the basis of German military prepara-
tions has been destroyed ; the troops of Great Britain
have already been and those of your country are
being gradually withdrawn. This shows clearly that
there is no more military action in the special area,
and that the said area ought to be cancelled admits

18 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

of no doubt." Japan, for apparent reasons, received
China's suggestion with displeasure, and considered
it as a sort of pin-prick policy on the part of the
Chinese Government. And in the Japanese press —
which is always government inspired — ^there was a
great outburst of indignation over the Chinese re-
quest. All the newspapers in Japan affected to re-
gard it as an "insult" to the Japanese Government,
not realising the fact that Japan's concurrence in
the abolition was not necessary and was asked for
by the Chinese Government piu'ely as an act of cour-
tesy.

The hostile spirit with which China's suggestion
for the cancellation of the special war area in Shan-
timg was received by the Japanese press, and the re-
peated refusal of the Japanese Government to act
on the suggestion, left no alternative for the Chinese
Government but to proceed to abolish the zone.
Proper steps were taken, and the special military
area delimited for the purpose of meeting the
emergency of the Anglo- Japanese attack upon
Tsingtao was cancelled. On January 7, 1915, the
Japanese Government was officially notified of the
cancellation through its Minister in Peking. Mr.
Hioki Eki, Japanese Minister in Peking, replied two
days later that the Japanese Government would not
recognise the cancellation. In a note dated January
16, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed
out in reply that, as there was no more military ac-
tion in the speciall area delimited for the purpose, the

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 19

same ought to be cancelled. "As efforts have always
been made to effect an amicable settlement of affairs
between your country and ours/* continued the
Chinese Foreign Minister, "it is oiu- earnest hope
that yoiu' government will act upon the principle of
preserving peace in the Far East and maintaining
international confidence and friendship/'

But these expressions for peace and friendship
fell on deaf ears. The Japanese Government was
not prepared to listen to them. On January i8,
within thirty-six hours of the expression of this
earnest hope for an amicable settlement by the
Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Hioki, Japanese Min-
ister in Peking, called at the office of the President
and presented to him in person, not a reply to the
note of the Chinese Government of January i6, but
the Twenty-one Demands, which had absolutely
nothing to do with the question of the military zone
at issue, but for the presentation of which the aboli-
tion of the zone by the Chinese Government was
made a timely and convenient excuse. The diplo-
matic procedure that Japan has adopted in her deal-
ings with China is not infrequently out of the usual
rut, and this presentation of the Twenty-one De-
mands to the President of the Chinese Republic,
without going through the Chinese Foreign Office,
and under the most flimsy pretext, is but one illus-
tration.

Now in order to understand the real nature and
significance of these demands we have but to refer

20 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

to the appendices, in which both the original and
the revised texts can be found. Compare them with
the exacting demands which Austria-Hungary had
made upon Serbia, and the difference is rather strik-
ing. We recall that Serbia was willing and ready to
accept all the demands except the ninth and the tenth,
for which arbitration was suggested as an alterna-
tive. The ninth demand consisted in that all offi-
cers and officials guilty of propaganda against Aus-
tria-Hungary, which resulted in the assassination of
the Austrian Archduke, were to be dismissed, the
Government of Austria-Hungary reserving to itself
the right to commtmicate to the Serbian Govern-
ment the names and doings of such officers and offi-
cials. The tenth demand was that the representa-
tives of Austria-Hungary should assist Serbia in
suppressing the movement directed against the ter-
ritorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy and take
part in the judicial proceedings on Serbian territory
against persons accessory to the Sarajevo crime.
These two demands Serbia refused to accept, and
her refusal was the immediate cause of the outbreak
of the European War in August, 1914. Now com-
pare the Austrian demands on Serbia and the Japan-
ese demands on China, the former being made on
accotmt of the Sarajevo crime and the latter because
of China's refusal to violate her neutrality in the
European War. If the Austrian demands to Serbia
were drastic, the Twenty-one Demands on China
were htmdred times more so; if the former were

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 21

incompatible with the sovereignty of Serbia, the lat- '
ter were in conflict with China's very right of self-
preservation; and if the former were directly re-
sponsible for the outbreak of the war, the latter were
certainly, as a castis belli, infinitely more justifiable.
It is rather unfortunate, however, that a great
deal was lost in the rendering of the list of demands
from its original text in Chinese into English, and
the menace which was revealed in the Chinese origi-
nal was made to appear more or less insignificant
in its English version. "By transferring Eastern
thoughts into Western moulds," a well-known writer
on China has observed, "things that are like nails in
the hands of soft sensitive Oriental beings are made
to appear to the steel-clad West as cool-blooded,
evolutionary necessities which may be repellent but
which are never cruel." While, on the other hand,
"to study the original Chinese text is to pass as it
were into the secret recesses of the Japanese brain,
and to find in that darkened chamber a whole world
of things which advertise ambitions mixed with limi-
tations, hesitations overwhelmed by audacities, great-
nesses succumbing to littlenesses, and vanities hav-
ing the appearance of velleities."

II

THE PRESENTATION OF THE DEMANDS

THAT which attracted our attention first was
the manner in which these demands were pre-
^ sented to China. It was most extraordinary,
and most significant. Instead of communicating
them to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs,
as is the customary diplomatic procedure, the Japa-
nese Minister presented them to the President of
China in person. The Chinese Foreign Office thus
became in the eyes of the Japanese diplomat a
useless governmental machinery, of which he re-
fused even to make the ordinary use.

On January 18, 1915, Mr. Hioki, Japanese Min-
ister in Peking, sought a private interview with
President Yuan Shih-k'ai. The alleged' purpose for
the interview was "to explain the attitude of his
government towards China and to bring home to
the President the fact that the Japanese Government
was anxious to settle a few outstanding questions
with China." The request was, of course, readily
complied with; but it must be understood that in
granting the interview the Chinese President, or
any one else in the Chinese Government, had not
the slightest idea of what was actually in the Japan-
ese Minister's sleeve. It was thought that some ques-

22

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 23

tion relating to the special war zone in Shantung
which the Chinese Gk)vemment had just abolished,
might be made a subject of discussion. "Or, per-
haps the Japanese Minister wished," as an American
writer has sarcastically put it, "to convey personally
to the President the pleasant assurances of Japan's
consideration and friendship which Count Okuma
previously had conveyed through mutual friends, or
perhaps Mr. Hioki's call was socially diplomatic."
To the utter surprise of the Chinese Government,
and to the astonishment of the President himself Mr.
Hioki's request for a private interview was made
for the purpose of presenting to the President in
person the Twenty-one Demands. It has since be-
come known that such extraordinary procedure was
resorted to by the Japanese diplomat so that the
Chinese Govenmient could be impressed with their
unusual importance.

The interview took place in the evening. Accord-
ing to the details recounted by one who was present,
the interview was most dramatic and yet most for-
mal. After the usual exchange of words of amen-
ities. President Yuan Shih-k'ai sat down and listened
to what the Japanese Minister had to say. "With a
mien of great mystery and importance the Minister
opened the discussion. He enjoined absolute secrecy,
on pain of serious consequences, before handing
Yuan the text of the demands." President Yuan
listened quietly, and without any interruption, to the
reading of the demands. The Japanese Minister,

24 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

when he had finished with the reading, explained
to the President that the Twenty-one Demands were
submitted for immediate acceptance by China, with
a view to removing the antagonistic feelings which
had found expression in a large section of the Japa-
nese people against President Yuan Shih-k'ai himself,
and consequently against his government. The ac-
ceptance of these demands, Mr. Hioki, in a rather
naive manner, gave it as his opinion, would not only
disarm the personal animosity of the Japanese people
against the President, but would also strengthen the
relation of good neighbourhood between the two
countries. He warned President Yuan that the
Chinese revolutionists were very active in Japan in
fomenting a third revolution against the Peking
Government. While the; Japanese Government had
no sympathy with the Chinese revolutionists, he said,
it would, however, find itself imable to restrain their
activities, should the President decline to accept
these demands in toto. In that case, nor could the
Japanese Government tell what might happen to
President Yuan himself or to the Peking Govern-
ment, if the Chinese revolutionary leaders in Japan
should be permitted to go imrestrained. The Japa-
nese Minister urged that it was, therefore, in the best
interest of the President himself * and the Govem-

♦The Japanese Minister was said to have also dropped a
few significant hints as to the possibility of helping make
President Yuan the Emperor of China, — 2l line of argument
whidi was intended to influence the President personally.
"Indeed, there is no reason to doubt that the Japanese Envoy

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 25

ment of China that the Twenty-one Demands should
be accepted without delay and without reservation,
as they had no other object than that of settling the
"outstanding questions" between China and Japan.
And in the same interview, the Japanese Minister
complained of China's foreign policy which he char-
acterised as one of "befriending the distant nations
and showing hostility to her immediate neighbours."
As a proof of this policy, he pointed to the fact that
Great Britain and the United States were often taken
as China's friends and sponsors, while Japan, who
was China's next-door neighbour and deserved to
be the leader of the Far East, was frequently dis-
regarded. He expressed the hope, therefore, that
the willing acceptance of the Twenty-one Demands
would put China and Japan in better and more
friendly relations.

A long lecture it was, indeed, and one which was
given when it was least expected. The Japanese
diplomat could not, of course, finish the interview
without enjoining absolute secrecy in regard to the
demands. No disclosure of them, he urged, should
be made to any Power; and he went even so far as
to threat that should the demands become known to
the public, Japan would be compelled to present
harsher and more severe ones to China. This en-
joinment of strictest secrecy was given by the Japan-

actually told Yuan Shih-k'ai that s^s he was already virtually
Emperor it lay within his power to settle the whole business
and to secure his position at one blow."

26 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

ese Minister as "his sincere advice" and "in the best
interests of both countries."

Throughout this interview, President Yuan re-
mained silent, and showed no sign of perturbation.
"A less experienced, strong, and astute statesman
than Yuan Shih-k'ai might well have been stimned,
and cowed, by Japan's demands and the manner of
their presentation." At the conclusion of the con-
versation, he merely remarked that China could not
be expected to make such concessions as asked for,
and that until he had the opportunity of examining
the list of demands carefully, he had nothing to
say. So, with the usual exchange of words of per-
functory nature, the interview ended.

Now, it is hardly necessary to say that history
has very few instances, if any, which can be parallel
to this high-handed manner in which these demands
were made. Without the least hint of premoni-
tion from the Japanese Government or its representa-
tive in Peking, and without going through the
Chinese Foreign Office, which is the regular inter-
mediary between the Chinese Government and the
accredited diplomatic representatives in the Chinese
capital, the Japanese Minister, under the pretext of
a private interview, served the demands on Presi-
dent Yuan in person. After presentation, the Presi-
dent was then cautioned to keep them absolutely
secret. This deliberate departure from the custom-
ary procedure of intercourse was justly characterised
as contrary to diplomatic decency and usage.

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 27

In the previous chapter, it has been stated that
Japan seized upon the abolition by Qiina of the
special war zone in Shantung as the immediate ex-
cuse for the presentation of the Twenty-one De-
mands. From the First Instructions* given by
Baron Kato, then Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, to Mr. Hioki, which were officially pub-
lished at Tokio on June 9, 1915, we note that the
presentation of the Twenty-one Demands to China
had been decided upon for a long time. On his
leave of absence,! Mr. Hioki was given on Decem-
ber 4, 1914, the text of Twenty-one Demands —
styled as "proposals" in the Instructions — ^which he
was to present to the Chinese Government at a
"suitable opportunity." "Believing it absolutely
essential for strengthening Japan's position in East-
em Asia as well as for preservation of the general
interests of that region to secure China's adherence
to the foregoing proposals (meaning the Twenty-
one Demands), the Imperial Grovemment are de-
termined to attain this end by all means within their
power. You are, therefore, requested to use your
best endeavour in the conduct of the negotiations,
which are hereby placed in your hands." Upon his
return to Peking, Mr. Hioki waited for the "suitable
opportunity." It was decided that the "suitable op-

* Vide, Appendix A.

t It was assumed in some quarters that Mr. Hioki was
recalled so that he could receive the instructions about the
Twenty-one Demands from Baron Kato, the Foreign Min-
ister, in person.

28 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

portunity" had arrived when the Chinese Govern-
ment abolished the military zone in Shantung. On
January 7, 1915, the Japanese Minister was in-
formed that the special war zone was cancelled and
the original status of the area was restored. The
Japanese Minister was requested to call upon his
government to withdraw all Japanese troops in the
said area "in order to respect the neutrality of
China." On January 9, the Japanese Minister re-
plied, upon receipt of telegraphic instruction from
Tokio, that the abolition of the war zone was con-
sidered as "an act, improper, arbitrary, betraying, in
fact, want of confidence in international good faith
and regardless of friendly relations." On January
16, the Chinese Foreign Minister again explained
the reasons for the abolishment, pointing out the
fact that, inasmuch as military operations had ceased,
the raison d'etre for the war zone had also ceased to
exist. To this explanation, the Japanese Grovem-
ment did not reply. The only reply from the Japan-
ese Government came in the form of the Twenty-one
Demands.*

Those who have carefully watched the develop-
ment of the poltical situation in the Far East have
unanimously agreed that the Twenty-one Demands
were as drastic as the time of their presentation
was opportune. Little attempt has been made by

*It is interesting to state that the demands were written
on Japanese War Office papers, "water-marked with dread-
noughts and machine-guns/'

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 29

Japan for years past to conceal her ambitions in
China, yet no such a bold move she would dare, had
it not been for the war in Etu"ope which absorbed
all the attentions of the belligerent Powers. The
outbreak of the armed struggle in Europe in August,
1914, was considered by Japan as an opportimity,
"that never comes again in hundred years," to set-
tle a few outstanding questions with China. The
field was clear, and her hands were free. Gloom in
Europe was sunshine for Japan, and no one should
be stirprised that she would make hay while she
could.

Japan found it still necessary to go under covers,
however. Aside from the desperate attempts which
she made for keeping the demands absolutely secret
— ^attempts whidi we shall deal in extenso in the fol-
lowing chapter, the idea was industriously propa-
gated that the demands were nothing more than "a
counter-blast to German pretensions in China."
When carefully analysed, they appeared to be more
of a counter-blast to British, rather than to Ger-
man, pretensions in China. An accurate estimate of
the demands was arrived at in an editorial of the
North-China Herald of February 9, 1915, when it
said : "Even admitting, for the sake of argument,
that Japan is so utterly lost to all sense of honour
as to try to steal a march on her partners (in the
war), self-interest would deter her from taking so
hazardous a step. Above all, she is bound by her
alliance with Great Britain; and looking back upon

30 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

the record of that association, we cannot believe that
after so many years of unceasing loyalty to it, she
would deliberately profit by the present time of
woild stress to undermine her Ally's position in
China.*' Whether or not "J^P^^ was so utterly lost
to all sense of honotu^' we do not care to inquire ; it
is quite evident, however, that she had stolen "a
march on her partners in the war." It might be
true that Japan was "bound by her alliance with
Great Britain" and that she had shown "unceasing
loyalty to it" in the past. It is certainly true that
she deliberately took advantage of the world stress
"to undermine her Ally's position in China." For,
to quote an editorial from the Japan Mail, "if it is
Japan's settled policy to dominate and control China
and to achieve the hegemony of Eastern Asia, this
appears to be an ideal opportunity. The hands of
Europe are tied. The hands of the United States
are folded in peace. China herself is impotent.
Europe has set Japan a bad example. What is Japan
that she should rise superior to the common level and
show a self-restraint, an unselfish regard for the
rights of the other nations and peoples, when the
whole civilised world is in a debacle of conflicting
national ambitions and selfishness?"

Ill

ATTEMPT AT SECRECY

THE presentation by Japan, and later the un-
willing acceptance by the Chinese Govern-
ment almost forced at the point of bayonet,
of the Twenty-one Demands, could easily be the
most important event in the history of the Far East,
greater in consequences than the Chino- Japanese
War or the Russo-Japanese War. Its real signifi-
cance — or, more correctly, the real significance of
the Twenty-one Demands — ^was dimly douded by
the war in Europe at the time, and for that reason,
it did not receive the full attention of the Western
Powers as it surely merited. It was no wonder,
therefore, that statesmen like Mr. Lloyd George
should have frankly admitted in the Council of the
Prime Ministers at the Versailles Peace Conference
that he had never heard of the Twenty-one Demands
before — ^that is, before the Chinese delegates brought
them up for consideration at the Conference.

We have pointed out that the Japanese Minister
threatened, after the presentation of the demands,
to take more drastic measures, should they become
known to the public, or were they communicated to
the other Powers. It was highly necessary, of

31

32 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

course, that absolute secrecy should be observed, in
order to prevent the other Powers, including Great
Britain, Japan's ally, from knowing what was going
on between China and Japan. In view of the fact
that Japan chose such a moment to settle the "out-
standing questions" with China when the European
Powers were all engaged in the war, it was believed
that the Japanese statesmen who were responsible
for the coup had really thought that it was quite
feasible to coerce the Chinese Government into ac-
ceptance, without being known to the other interested
Powers at all. 'In short, Japan put the sword at
China's throat, and intended to impose star-chamber
proceedings until China's assent was secured." To
accomplish this, Japan used her wide-spread con-
trol and influence over international publicity relat-
ing to Far Eastern affairs. Thus for a number of
weeks after the presentation of these demands every-
thing remained clothed in impenetrable mystery, and
despite every effort on the part of the foreign cor-
respondents and native journalists in Peking, re-
liable details of what was occuring could not be ascer-
tained. The Chinese Government did, of course,
its best to guard the secret,* and the whole affair

♦In the Communique which the Japanese Government is-
sued, May 7, this assertion was made: "The Chinese Gov-
ernment, in disregard of the understanding which was made
at the commencement of the negotiations to keep the pro-
ceedings of the conferences strictly secret, made public the
Japanese proposals, in various exaggerated forms and en-
deavoured to stir up the feelings of the Powers against
Japan."

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 33

would not have travelled beyond the limits of the
Japanese Legation or the Chinese Foreign Office,
had not the details of the demands been published
first by an enterprising Japanese newspaper in
Osaka in an extra edition, and then by tike Japan
Mail, a semi-official paper in Tokio, which on April
1 issued the complete text of the demands in English.
As soon as the news ieaked out, the foreign lega-
tions in Peking began to inquire unofficially as to
what were the real demands and what was then
actually going on behind the scene.* The Japanese
Government used all the means at its disposal to
prevent the disclosure of these demands. Several
leading papers in Tokio were disciplined for pub-
lishing reports about the demands, and comment
about them was for a time absolutely forbidden in
Japanese newspapers. On January 28, 1915, Ren-
ter's agent telegraphed from Tokio, saying that
"the information originating at Peking and else-
where purporting to outline the basis of negotiations
between Japan and China is absolutely without

♦The demands were made on January 18. Dr. Paul S.
Keinsch, then American in Peking, related the following inci-
dent, apropos of Japan's desperate attempt of keeping the
demands secret: "A Japanese newspaper reporter called at
the (American) Legation on January 19 and related his
troubles to one of the secretaries. The Japanese Minister
refused absolutely, he said, to say anything about what had
passed between him and the President night before. With
his assumed naivete the man possibly hoped to get a hint as
to whether a leak* had occurred between the Chinese and
the American Minister." Dr. Reinsch admitted, however,
that on January 21, he first learned the astonishing nature of
the Japanese "proposals."

34 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

foundatioTL" Similar denials were given out by
the Japanese-controlled news agencies in Europe and
in the United States. What was still more appre-
hensive was the fact that the Japanese Government,
through its representatives at London, Washington,
Paris, Petrograd, et al, officially denied the authen-
ticity of the news. We recall how freely the Japa-
nese Ambassador at London had issued statements
contradicting the newspaper reports and characteris-
ing them as insidious inventions. We recall also how
easily the Japanese representative at Washington
had given out assurances of Japan's anxiety for the
maintenance of the Open Door policy in China and
her desire for the preservation of the territorial in-
tegrity of the Qiinese Republic In the face of such
a barrage of official denials and contradictions, it
was no wonder that The Associated Press of the
United States and The Wolff Agency in Europe
should withhold from publication the text of the
Twenty-one Demands, which was in their possession,
being telegraphed to them from their correspondents
in Tokio. The Associated Press, in view of the
categorical denial by the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington, went so far as to direct its representa-
tives in Peking and Tokio to send "facts, not
rumours."

But unfortunatdy for Japan, such journalistic
tactics and diplomatic dementi could fool some of
the people some of the time, not all the people all
the time. . Such tactics could not long impede the

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 35

desire of the world at large to know just what was
going on behind the closed doors of Wai-chiao-pu,
or long resist the search for information by the rep-
resentatives of the foreign Powers in Peking who
were frankly anxious to know the exact nature of
the demands. Comprehending the immense im-
portance of the matter and greatly stirred up by the
newspaper reports in the Far East, Sir John N.
Jordan, then British Minister in Peking, directly in-
quired of the Japanese Minister there about the de-
mands. Mr. Hioki admitted that a memorandum
had been presented to the Chinese Government, but
assured his British colleague that only eleven points,
instead of twenty-one, were raised and that they did
not infringe upon China's political independence,
territorial integrity, or the rights of other foreign
nations in China. In the light of the later events,
and of the original demands now known, what the
Japanese Minister had said to the British represen-
tative bore little resemblance to truth. But this was
not the only instance where Japan failed to give the
true story of the matter. The idea that only eleven
demands were made upon China was sedulously
propagated through the Japanese Embassies in
Paris, London, Washington, and Petrograd.

In this connection, it may add that the Far East-
em Review, at that time a zealous supporter of China
and her sovereign rights, made a pertinent comment
apropos of Japan's attempt at secrecy, which de-
serves to be quoted:

36 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMA^JDS

"Notwithstanding all the efforts to keep the terms of
the demands secret their general tenor was telegraphed
to Great Britain and America by newspaper cor-
respondents in Peking. To counteract the eflfect of
this inconvenient disclosure of its designs the Japa-
nese Government took the extremely risky step of
denying that it had presented twenty-one demands to
Qiina. The Japanese embassies abroad, while at first
denying knowledge of the demands, ultimately issued
statements that all reports from Peking were g^oss
exaggerations inspired by Germany and that as a
matter of fact only eleven demands of an innocuous
character had been presented. What purported to be
a complete list of the demands was supplied to the
Governments of Great Britain, America, France and
Russia. From this edition of demands those to which
the Treaty Powers could take most exception were
carefully excluded. Many people have found it hard
to believe that Japan should be so foolish as to en-
deavour in the first instance to prevent the demands
from being divulged, and in the second to seek, after
they had become known, to delude the other nations
interested as to their extent and character. It must
be admitted that it is difficult to understand why
statesmen with such a reputation for astuteness as
the Japanese should adopt measures so futile and so
puerile, but there is no escaping from the facts.
Japan deliberately took a course which reflects upon
her trustworthiness and which has convinced many
that her most solemn assurances must be received
with the greatest reserve.'*

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 37

The truth of the matter, however, was that the
demands contained in the Fifth Group in particular
were so many infringements upon the treaty rights
of the foreign Powers in China, so many violations
of China's sovereignty, and so many breaches of
the Open Door policy, that, if known, they were
bound to arouse such serious objections from all
the Powers as to spoil the transaction altogether.
This the Japanese Government did not like to see
happening, much preferring to risk its own honest
reputation and its own moral position among the
family of nations. When it became officially known
that the demands were really twenty-one in number,
and not eleven, the Japanese Government was re-
sourceful enough to say that those demands in the
Fifth Group expressed Japan's wishes only, and that
they were not presented as demands at all. While
such an official explanation might be deemed as suffi-
cient to cover up a multitude of sins, it was cer-
tainly not convincing enough to leave no room for
doubt. The Chinese Government flatly contradicted
this explanation, when it pointed out that "the pro-
posals in this Fifth Group were presented to the
Chinese Government as demands and not as
'wishes.' " Even granting that the contention of ±he
Japanese Government was valid that the seven
"points" in the Fifth Group were merely "wishes,"
then the other Powers should have been informed
of thirteen, instead of eleven, demands, inasmuch

38 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

as there were twenty-one demands altogether.
Whether it was due to bad calculation or to other
reasons that only "eleven points" were officially given
out by the Japanese Government, is a question which
answers itself.

IV

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ANALYSED

—GROUP I

m

SO much for the procedure in the presentation
of the Twenty-one Demands and the oblique
methods which the Japanese Government had
seen fit to employ for the purpose of keeping them
secret. It now remains for us to review seriatim
the demands themselves and to follow the tortuous
course of diplomatic negotiation.

The demands of the First Group called upon the
Chinese Government (i) to give "full consent"
to all matters which the Japanese Government might
arrange with the German Government in regard to
the disposition of German rights, interests, and con-
cessions in Shantung; (2) to engage not to alienate
"to a third Power" any territory within Shantung
or any island along its coast; (3) to consent to
Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lung-
kow to join the Shantung (from Kiao-chow to Tsi-
nan-fu) Railway; and (4) to open "important cities
and towns in the Province of Shantung as commer-
cial ports/'

In this Group of demands, quite a few interesting
points were involved. Imprimis, Japan seemed to
have completely ignored Great Britain, her ally, and

39

40 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAlNDS

her partner in the Tsingtao expedition. The cap-
ture of the German stronghold in Shantung was not
due to one man or one nation's work. It was the
accomplishment of the joint forces of the two coun-
tries. How, then, could the Japanese Government
alone, evidently without the knowledge of the British
Government, proceed to negotiate with the Chinese
Government for the succession to the German rights
and properties in Shantung, which were captured
by the joint forces of the two nations? The fact
that British soldiers had co-operated with Japanese
forces in the reduction of Tsingtao was completely
ignored or forgotten. Secondly, it may be noted
that, in making these demands relating to Shan-
tung, Japan presumably proceeded on the theory that
she succeeded, after the expulsion of Germany from
the said province, to all the rights, privileges, and
concessions previously enjoyed by Germany. As a
matter of fact, however, Japan demanded more than
what Germany had enjoyed before the war. The
request for the right to build a railway by Japan
from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect the trans-
Shantung line, for instance, testified to this fact.
And in the third place, Japan seemed to have entirely
ignored the fact that the most important subject-
matter of the First Group of demands — ^the dispo-
sition of German concessions in Shantung — related
to the post-bellum settlement, and as such, it should
be left over for negotiation by all the interested
Powers at the forthcoming Peace Conference. Was

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 41

Japan at all sure then that the Allies were going
to win the war? It seemed that she had taken for
granted that Germany was as good as vanquished.
And finally, it must be observed, the demand requir-
ing China not to cede or lease to a third Power any
territory in the Province of Shantung or any island
on its coast was most derogatory of China's sov-
ereignty. It brought us back to the days of inter-
national scramble towards the end of the nineteenth
century when Japan and the leading European na-
tions vied with one another for territorial conces-
sions from China. The demand was made worse
for the reason that "a third Power" meant to ex-
clude Japan, thus leaving herself free to take hold
of anything in Shantung or along its coast*

We notice that the demands in the First Group
were introduced by a preamble which said as much
as that the demands were intended for "maintain-
ing the general peace in Eastern Asia and further
strengthening the friendly relations and good
neighborhood existing between the two nations."
Studying them in their true light, we have failed to
see how they could contribute to the maintenance

♦"One of Japan's demands in this Group evidently was
obliquely aimed at the United States of America— the article
asking that China will not cede or lease to a third Power
(meaning any Power except Japan) any territory or island
in Shantung or on its coast. For many years tiie American
Asiatic squadron has used Chefoo as a base for summer prac-
tice, and several times a project for the United States to lease
that port for a naval base and coaling station has been
mooted."— T. F. Millard, "Our Eastern Question."

42 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

of peace in Eastern Asia or to the improvement of
the neighbourly relations of the two countries. On
the very contrary, we perceive that they were des-
tined to disturb the political tranquillity in the Far
East and the friendly relations between the two
governments. It is easy to see how the Japanese
Government, with sugar-coated words of peace and
friendship, essayed to hide the grim and sinister
realities. The Chinese Government was called upon
to give f uU consent to whatever Shantimg arrange-
ment that Japan might make with Germany; to
pledge not to cede or lease any territory in Shan-
tung to a third Power; to grant to Japan the right
of constructing a railway from Chef oo or Limgkow
to connect the Shantimg Railway; and to open im-
portant cities and towns in the province for foreign
(which means for Japanese) trade and residence.*
If the general peace in Eastern Asia and the friend-
ship between China and Japan depended upon the
acceptance by the Chinese Government of these de-
mands, it is evident, then, that Japan was to be
bought for her willingness to maintain peace and
to continue friendly relations with her neighbour.
"It was palpable that the whole of the demands were
intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan

♦The Chinese Official Statement says on this point: "This
was a demand on the part of Japan for privileges additional
to any that hitherto had been enjoyed by Germany and was
not an outcome of the hostilities between Japan and Germany,
nor, in the opinion of the Chinese Gnovemment, was its
acceptance essential to the preservation of peace in the Far
East"

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 43

without securing a quid pro quo of any kind for
China." It was equally palpable that the acceptance
of these demands was a necessary part of the price
for her to preseive peace in the Far East.

The real significance of the First Group of de-
mands cannot be realised until one takes into con-
sideration the railway situation in Northern China.
In the first place, Japan desired to succeed to the
German rights and concessions in Shantung, among
which was included the trans-Shantung Railway,
known as the Kiao-chow-Tsinanfu Railway. Ger-
many had also the right, by virtue of the notes ex-
changed, December 31, 1913, of constructing a rail-
way from Kaomi, and, passing through I-chow-fu
and I-hsien, terminating at Hanchuang, there con-
necting with the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway; and
another line starting from Tsinanfu to connect the
Peking-Hankow Railway at a place between Shun-
teh-fu and Hsin-hsiang-hsien. To both lines Japan
claimed to succeed. Now, these railways together
with the other concessions in Shantimg, "were the
fruits of sixteen years of German aggression."
"Their transfer to Japan means that the Teutonic
methods, which enabled Germany to dominate and
exploit the province, will pass into the hands of the
Power with a great military base already standing
on Chinese soil at Port Arthur."

But this is not all. Japan also claimed the right
of building a railway from Cheefoo or Limgkow to
join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway. The mean-

44 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

ing of this demand, considered in conjunction with
Japan's right to succeed to the Kaiochow-Tsinanfu
Railway and to the other two lines running into the
provinces of Kiangsu and Chili, is that Japan would
practically dominate North China through her con-
trol of the railways in the region. The situation
becomes all the worse when it is remembered that
Japan has been in control over the South Manchurian
Railway and has been granted the right of con-
structing a number of railways in Inner Mongolia.
The Chinese delegates at the Peace Conference at
Versailles described the situation succinctly and ac-
curately :

"Through the trans-Shantung railway, with its
western or inland terminus at the provincial capital of
Tsinanfu where it flanks the northern section of the
Tientsin-Pukow Railway — ^built by the Germans —
Japan will at once dominate the whole of Shantung
as well as the northern half of this important trunk
line. Then, by financing, constructing and supplying
the material's for the first of the aforesaid 'two lines
of railway,* i,e., a line from the city of Kaomi, on the
trans-Shantung railway, to a point strategically domi-
nating the southern or British constructed section of
the same Tientsin-Pukow Railway, Japan will prac-
tically master the great railroad linking Tientsin (the
port of Peking) and North China with the Yangtze
Valley and South China.

"Next, by financing, etc., the second of the 'two
lines of railway/ i.e., a line practically extending

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 45

the trans-Shantung Railway from Tsinanfu, where it
will bisect the Tientsin-Pukow trunk line, to a point
westward on the Peking-Hankow Railway, Japan will
flank the other of the two trunk lines connecting
Peking and North Qiina with Central and Southern
China.

"And when it is borne in mind that Japan also con-
trols the railway systems in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, the extent of Japan's railway
domination of China north of the great line of the
Yangtze will be realised.

"This fact also must be noted. It means the isola-
tion of Peking which will be cut oflF from Central and
Southern China not only by land but by the sea-route,
owing to the Gulf of Pechili — ^through which Peking
can be reached via its port of Tientsin — ^being directly
dominated by the Japanese at Port Arthur."

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ANALYSED

—GROUP II

THE seven demands in Group II exact in
favour of Japan and her nationals a series
of preferential rights, interests and privi-
leges in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia calculated at once to increase the existing diffi-
culties which seriously hamper effective Chinese ad-
ministration in these two areas and to develop a sit-
uation facilitating the extension thereto of the terri-
torial system which has transformed Korea into a
Japanese province."

This is the language which the Chinese del^;a.tes
at the Versailles Peace Conference employed in
characterising the demands of the Second Group,
which affected, one and all, most vitally the terri-
torial integrity and administrative independence of
China in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia.

Furthermore, the demands of this Group were in
complete contravention of the Open Door principle,
violating a nimiber of treaties existing between
Japan and China, and between Japan and other Pow-
ers about China. This Group was generally in-
terpreted, and correctly too, as an attempt by Japan

86

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 47

to consolidate her interests in South Manchuria,
obtained as a result of the Russo-Japanese War,
and to extend them into a new region, Eastern Inner
Mongolia, which is, in the language of the Qiinese
Government, " a new expression in Chinese geo-
graphical terminology."

A more careful examination of the demands,
however, revealed the fact that it was not consolida-
tion, but extension, of Japanese interests in those
regions that was really aimed at by the Japanese
Government. This was made plain by the desire of
the Japanese Government to extend the leases of the
Kwantung peninsula and of the Antimg-Mukden
and the South Manchvuian Railways, and to secure
for its nationals political and economic rights and
privileges never before enjoyed by them.

The demands were introduced by a queer pre-
amble. It alleged that "the Chinese Government
has always acknowledged the special position en-
joyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia." This was contrary to the fact,
for the Chinese Government had never acknowl-
edged anything of the kind. The furthest that the
Chinese Government went was its agreement in
1905 to the transfer to Japan of the Russian con-
cessions in South Manchuria after the Russo-Japa-
nese War.

As has been pointed out, the demands were in-
compatible with the principle of the Open Door.
And the incompatibility becomes apparent when we

48 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

come to analyse the gradients of the demands.
Japan demanded for her nationals the right to lease
or own land in South Manchuria and Eastern In-
ner Mongolia; to travel and reside freely in those
regions; to engage in business and manufacture of
any kind whatsoever; to open mines, build railways,
and to monopolise loans to China for development
purpose in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia. Aside from these privileges -and rights
which would immediately create for the Japanese
a status im warranted by the terms of the existing
treaties between China and Japan and would thus
give them a freedom of action which would be a
serious restriction of the sovereignty of China and
infringement of her administrative rights, the Chi-
nese Government was called upon to hand over to
the Japanese Government the control and manage-
ment of the Kirin-Changchim Railway for a term
of 99 years, and to employ none but Japanese for
positions of financial and military advisers or in-
structors in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia. That these demands were outrageous to
the extreme could admit of no doubt. They meant
to create for the Japanese such a privileged status
in those regions that it would neither be in conso-
nance with the Open Door policy nor in harmony
with Japan's professed desire for the maintenance
of the territorial integrity and political independence
of the Chinese Republic.
It is a well-known fact that the extension of the

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA' 49

term of the leased territory had long been broached
among the political circles in Tokio. In fact, the
visit of Baron Fukushima, one time Governor-Gen-
eral of Port Arthur and Kwantung, to Peking in
January, 1914, was attributed to his desire for the
extension of the lease. His mission was a com-
plete failure, for the determination of the Chinese
Government not to extend the existing leases could
not be moved. "Owing to the bitter experiences
which China sustained in the past in connection
with the leased portions of her territory, it has
become her settled policy not to grant further leases
nor to extend the terms of those now in existence."
As the term of the leases would soon expire, some-
thing had to be done, and done quickly. Diplo-
macy is a tortuous course, which may not be able
to arrive at results in the shortest time possible.
The only alternative was that Japan tried to force
an extension of the leases from the Chinese Gov-
ernment, which she could not secure through diplo-
matic persuasion. It was, therefore, no surprise
that Japan should have preceded all other demands
in the Second Group that of extension of the lease
of Port Arthur and Dalny, and that of the South
Manchurian railways. The Chinese Government
was forced to abandon its own cherished hopes to
regain control of these territories and properties at
the expiration of their respective original terms
of lease. The 25 -year lease of Port Arthur and
Dalny, the 36-year period of the South Manchurian

50 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Railway, and the 15-year period of the Antung-
Mukden Railway were, one and all, extended to 99
years! "The extension of these leaseholds means
the perpetuation of an alien political system in South
Manchuria that immediately menaces the territorial
integrity and independence of China," observed the
Chinese delegates at the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence. "Through Port Arthur — ^the most po'verful
citadel in continental Asia — and the commercial
base of Dalny which is linked with the South Man-
churia and Antung-Mukden lines, Japan politically
and commercially dominates a region through which
lies the 'historic road of invasions' into China. In
the past, Asiatic invaders have entered the country
from the North ; and it was through the Manchurian
'gate' that the last invaders crossed into the great
plains of Northern China, History and a sense of
realities seem to suggest a view of the Japanese sys-
tem in South Manchuria that cannot be reconciled
with the security of the Chinese Republic"

When all is said, it is necessary to point out
once more the serious nature of the right which
Japan had claimed for her nationals to travel, to
reside, to lease or own land, and to engage in the
business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever,
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
In the first place, the Chinese Government, inasmuch
as the people of Mongolia were not at all accustomed
to foreign trade and residence, could not suffer the
foreigners to travel or to do business in that r^on.

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 51

without feeling great anxiety about their safety.
Furthermore, to extend these privileges to the Japa-
nese subjects would entail the extension of the rights
of extraterritoriality to a large alien population,
which would not only be a source of future trouble,
but might also be a contributing cause whereby China
was to lose jurisdiction over a large area of her
territory. "Should Japanese subjects be granted the
right of owning land, it would mean that all the
landed property in the region might fall into their
hands thereby endangering China's territorial integ-
rity." Or, as an American writer observes, "it is
obvious that if these were agreed to, Japanese state-
aided enterprises could be dotted all over South
Manchuria, and China would have no jurisdiction
over the occupiers of the land. To all intents and
purposes the areas occupied by the Japanese would
be alienated from China, as with the growth of
the Japanese communities it is certain that there
would come a demand for the control of policing and
other municipal fimctions. The Chinese authorities
and police would be powerless to function, as extra-
territoriality would bar them. Right of entry to
land and premises could not be insisted upon by the
Chinese police and other authorities and conse-
quently the Chinese Government would lose juris-
diction over an area only limited by the extent
to which the Japanese could appeal to the cupidity
of the Chinese landowners. Moreover it would ap-
pear that by virtue of the most-favoured-nation

52 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

clause other nationalities would, acquire whatever
rights the Japanese secured. Clearly this would
tend further to reiStrict China's jurisdiction and to
increase the chance of complications." Indeed, if
these rights and privileges were granted to the Japa-
nese, but not extended to the nationals of the other
Powers, then the Japanese would have a preferred
position which would enable them to monopolise
all the interests in the above-mentioned regions. If
the same and similar rights and privileges were
given to all foreigners, as they should be imder the
rule of thp most favoured nation treatment and the
principle of equal opportunity, then China's adminis-
trative autonomy over the territory would become
a thing of the past. It was a veritable dilemma con-
fronting the Chinese Government when it imdertook
to negotiate the demands of the Second Group.

VI

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ANALYSED

—GROUP III

THE demands of the Third Group, relating to
the Japanese interests in the Hanyehping
Iron and Steel Works, betrayed at once the
desire of the Japanese. Government to control the
biggest iron works in China and its ambition to
monopolise the mineral resources of practically the
entire Yangtze Valley.

According to the demands, the Hanyehping Com-
pany was to be converted into a Chino-Japanese
joint concern, the rights and properties of which
were not to be disposed of without the previous
consent of the company, or the Japanese Govern-
ment, which meant in this case one and the same
thing. The Chinese Government, on the other hand,
was asked to agree that the mines in the neigh-
bourhood of those owned by the company were not
to be worked by other persons outside of the com-
pany, without the consent of the Japanese Gov-
ernment. The "blanket" character of these demands
was apparent. It is easily discernible that what
Japan had really wanted was not a Chino-Japanese
joint concern. A joint company could serve only
as a means to the end which she had in view. She

53

54 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

wanted in the first place an absolute control over
the largest iron works in China, so as to monopolise
the product to the exclusion of all other Powers (in-
cluding China, perhaps). She wanted then an ex-
clusive right to operate the mines in the Yangtze
Valley, conveniently and diplomatically styled as the
mines "in the neighbourhood of those owned by
the Hanyehping Company." It was pointed out at
the time that these demands were in direct con-
flict with the recognised interests of Great Britain
in the Yangtze Valley. "To accept joint Japa-
nese control of the Yanyehping Company, the
most successful enterprise in the country," said
a British diplomat, "would mean establishing
Japan at the very heart of the British sphere of
interest."

In a highly picturesque language, another British
writer put the situation thus: "When we reach
Group III we touch matters that are not immediately
vital but quite new in their type of audacity and
which every one can to-day understand since they
are politico-industrial. Group III, as it stands in the
original text, is simply the plan for the conqtcest of
the mineral wealth of the Yangtze Valley which
mainly centres round Hankow because the vast allu-
vial plains of the lower reaches of this greatest of
rivers were once on the floor of the Yellow Sea,
the upper provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi be-
ing the region of prehistoric forests clothing the
coasts, which once looked down upon the slowly-

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 55

receding waste of waters, and which to-day contain
all the coal and iron."

The attention of the Japanese Government was re-
peatedly called to the fact that the Hanyang Arsenal,
the Tayeh Iron Mines, and the Ping-hsiang collier-
ies — called the Hanyehping Company generally for
the sake of convenience — ^were private concerns.
According to the Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of China, the private property of the Chi-
nese citizens cannot be interfered with by the Gov-
ernment. In other words, Chinese citizens are guar-
anteed the right of protection of their property and
freedom to engage in any lawful occupation, with
which the Chinese Government are precluded from
interfering. It was declared, therefore, that the
Chinese Government could not negotiate with Japan
to make any disposal of the company without doing
violence to the fundamental law of the land, or to
convert it into "a joint concern of the two nations."

It may be interesting to note that, in the preamble
which introduced the demands of this Group, the
Japanese Government asserted that "J^tpanese finan-
ciers and the Hanyehping Company have close re-
lations with each other at present." It also inti-
mated in broad terms that these demands, looking
towards the joint control of the Company and a
Japanese monopoly of the mineral deposits in the
heart of China, were made with no other purpose in
view than that of advancing "the common interests
of the two nations." Admittedly, the psychology

56 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

of the Japanese Government is difficult to under-
stand. How could a Japanese control of the Han-
yehping Company benefit China? And how could
an intended monopoly by Japan of the mineral
wealth of central China be made to serve the "com-
mon interests*' of the two coimtries? In order to
arrive at a fairly reasonable answer to these ques-
tions, and in order to understand, in concise lan-
guage, the way in which the "Japanese financiers
and the Hanyehping Company have come to close
relations with each other," we reproduce here in
extenso an editorial comment from the Far Eastern
Review, April, 1915, apropos of the subject. It
reads:

4

"The career of the Hanyehping Company, which
comprises the Hanyehping iron works, the Pinghsiang
coal mines, and the Tayeh iron mines, has been some-
what chequered. It has had recurring financial trou-
bles and, influenced by Sheng Ktmg-pao, who has
always been amicably disposed towards the Japanese,
it has largely employed Japanese money to assist it
over its difficulties. In the first instance a sum of
Tls. 5,000,000 was borrowed from a German firm, but
this was repaid later on by the Chinese Government.
Japan appears to have first come upon the scene in
1902, when a contract was entered into between the
Company and the Japanese Imperial Steel Foundry
whereby the latter was to be supplied with iron ore
from Tayeh for fifteen years. The Company was at
this time suffering from insufficiency of funds, and

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 57

two years after making the contract with the Steel
Foundry a sum of Tls. 3,000,000 was borrowed from
the Yokohama Specie Bank. Other debts to Japanese
concerns were contracted, and by 1912 the total
amount outstanding was in the neighbourhood of Tls.
9,000,000. The financial condition of the Company
showed no sign of improvement and in 1913 the sum
of $15,000,000 Mexican currency was borrowed from
the Japanese, who secured the right to appoint ad-
visers and other officials. This is a brief history of
the Company, showing how the Japanese have gradu-
ally won their way to a position in which they have
some voice in the management. It is said that the
Japanese have largely to thank Sheng Kung-pao for
the hold they have gained over the concern. The
shareholders, or a farge section of them, have long
been desirous of releasing the Company from its finan-
cial shackles, or at all events those riveted by Japan,
and it was hoped that a siun sufficient to pay off the
indebtedness to the Japanese could be borrowed from
America or Great Britain. Influence was brought to
bear, however, and this project was defeated. There
was also some talk of nationalising the Company, but
this also fell through.

"The preamble of the Hanyehping demands recites
that the proposed arrangement is for the 'common
interests' of China and Japan. It is difficult to con-
ceive what arguments could be advanced to show that
China's interests would be served by admitting Japan
as a partner in an enterprise of such paramount im-
portance. If it were necessary for China to secure
the assistance of another nation in the development

58 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

o4 her steel industry it would be clearly advantageous
for her to select a nation that had the benefit of long
experience and expert knowledge. Without casting
any reflection upon the Japanese it cannot be said
that they possess the qualifications that would justify
China in admitting them to partnership. Moreover,
it is evident that the partnership would consist of the
Japanese Government on the one hand and a Chinese
Company on the other. The control of an industry
upon which the greatness of so many countries is
based, would assuredly pass into the hands of the
Japanese and this is a possibility that no patriotic
Chinese would contemplate without alarm. The in-
terests of Japan, which, as is generally known, is badly
in need of iron ore owing to the poverty of her own
resources in this respect, would undoubtedly be served
if she were admitted to partnership-— the interests of
China would equally as assuredly suffer.

"When attention is directed to the second article
of the demand it is seen that not only does Japan
want to gain control of the Hanyehping Company,
but she wishes to prevent any other country from
working mines in the provinces in which the Hanyeh-
ping properties are situated. The Tayeh mine is in
Hupeh and the Pinghsiang coal mine is in Hunan.
The expression that is used, 'mines in the neighbour-
hood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company* is
comprehensive enough to enable Japan to veto any
mining operations in either province. It may be re-
called that when the question arose as to the meaning
of the term 'parallel to the South Manchuria Rail-
way' Japan insisted upon putting her own interpreta-

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 59

tion upon it, and it may safely be assumed that she
would act similarly if any question arose in regard to
mines in Hupeh and Hunan. It has to be borne in
mind that these provinces, Hunan in particular, are
immensely rich in mineral deposits and, with accept-
able mining regulations, would present a splendid field
for the investment of foreign capital. Japan now pro-
poses to prevent the investment of foreign capital in
this part of China. The demand is the more extraordi-
nary in view of Japan's relationship with Great Britain.
The alliance between the countries was contracted in
order that their interests in the Far East should be pro-
tected. Great Britain has admittedly special interests
in the Yangtze Valley, yet Japan proposes to render
it impossible for British capital to be invested in a
most important industry in this region. How can
Japan reconcile this demand with her engagements
with Great Britain and her often reiterated adherence
to the principle of equal opportunity? It must be con-
fessed that all the evidence points to a desire on the
part of Japan to secure for herself the sole right to de-
velop the mines of China. She has already secured a
monopoly in South Manchuria and Shantung ; she is de-
manding a monopoly in Hunan and Hupeh and Fukien.
Even were this not directly opposed to the pledge that
Japan has given to maintain the principle of the open
door, such a monopoly would be most disastrous for
China. Japan has no surplus capital of her own for
investment in mining enterprises, and as she would
scarcely be able to borrow money from other coun-
tries to work mines in China for her own benefit, the
result of the monopoly would be that China's mining

60 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

resources would remain undeveloped. It seems hardly
credible that Japan should seriously have presented
demands that conflict so directly with the interests of
the other Treaty Powers, but the fact that they have
been presented remains. China has hitherto declined
to take the Hanyehping demands into serious consid-
eration, and it is to be hoped for her own sake as
well as that of the Treaty Powers that she will be
able to resist the endeavour being made to induce her
to become a party to what can only be called an act
of political bad faith."

The truth of the matter is that Japan, having very
little coal or iron of her own, decided that the
sooner she could get control of China's almost in-
exhaustible resources the better. Before she made
the demand, Japan had, as has been pointed out in
the passage reproduced in the above, already ac-
quired considerable influence in the management of
the Hanyehping Company, largely through the
means of financial assistance. The great Tayeh
iron mines, which have been considered as one of
the richest in the country, had been drawn upon for
supplies of iron ore for the Japanese Government
Foundry at Wakamatsu (on the island of Kiushiu),
and the rich coal mines at Ping-hsiang had supplied
a good portion of fuel for the said foundry. Japan
was, however, not satisfied with tit-bits, and taking
advantage of the European War which absorbed the
attention of the British Government, she decided
that it would be best to seek a monopolistic control

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 61

of China's natural resources. Viscount Uchida, the
present Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, de-
clared at the opening of the Diet at Tokio, January,
1919 : "We have to rely, in a large measure, upon
the rich natural resources in China in order to as-
sure our own economic existence." This same point
was emphasised by Baron Makino, one of the Japa-
nese delegates at the Versailles Peace Conference,
when he declared: "China has the raw material:
we have need for raw material and we have the
capital to invest with China in its development for
use by ourselves as well as by China." Taken to-
gether with Japan's demands on China, particularly
those relating the Hanyehping Company now under
consideration, these two statements by the responsi-
ble Japanese tell the unmistakable tale of Japan's eco-
nomic ambitions in China. The Chinese delegates
at the Peace Conference were, however, very em-
phatic in their reply, when they said: "China does
not admit that her natural resources are necessary
to assure the economic existence of Japan any more
than the 'natural resources' of Alsace-Lorraine were
necessary to assure the economic existence of Ger-
many." China is, of course, incomparable with Al-
sace-Lorraine; but Japan is certainly another Ger-
many.

VII

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ANALYSED

—GROUP IV

OF all the demands which Japan had pressed
upon China for acceptance, none looks at
the first glance so innocuous, and yet reveals,
upon close examination, so intimately the working
of Japan's political mind, as the single demand con-
tained in the fourth Group. The Japanese Govern-
ment, "with the object of effectively preserving the
territorial integrity of China," demanded that the
Chinese Government should engage "not to cede or
lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island
along the coast of China."

Made under the pretext of preserving China's
territorial integrity, the demand appeared, therefore,
to have a good deal of plausibility, which might
easily be mistaken for Japan's! honesty of purpose.
The plausible character soon evaporates, however,
when the pretext is carefully examined and found to
be nothing more than the usual h)rpocrisy which has
distinguished Japanese diplomacy in China in the
last score of years. The innermost recess of the po-
litical minds of Japanese statesmen and diplomatists
is penetrated, when we come to weigh the real mean-
ing of the phrase "a third Power," — a phrase

62

JAT^AN VERSUS CHINA 63

as vague as it is definite, though it may seem para-
doxical to say. It is vague in the sense that it does
not refer to any particular Power ; it is very definite,
for it cannot mean Japan herself. The phrase refers
to any Power except Japan and China. In other
words, while pronouncing her solicitude for China's
territorial integrity, Japan was at the very same time
reserving to herself the right to despoil it. It would
be highly interesting to know, therefore, if Japan
would consider it a violation of the territorial in-
tegrity of China, if she herself should one day force
the Chinese Government to cede or to lease some
harbour or bay or island along the Chinese -coast.
Japan's sincerity of purpose could be easily proved
if she had frankly declared that no Chinese terri-
tory should be ceded or leased to any Power what-
soever, or if she had merely demanded that China
should not alienate her coast line to any Power at
all. Such a declaration, inasmuch as it would not
be consistent with the sovereignty of China, would
not, of course, be very agreeable to the Chinese Gov-
ernment. It would nevertheless serve to clear away
the general suspicion as to the territorial ambitions
which Japan has apparently entertained in China.

This was not the tmdertaking which Japan was
anxious to obtain from China. A declaration such
as along the lines suggested above would not only
prevent any "third Power" from violating the terri-
torial integrity of China, but would also debar Japan
herself from the execution of her ambitious designs

64 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

in Fukien, in Shantung, and in Manchuria. Japan
jwould not, of course, allow her hands tied in her
dealings with China, and nothing would be more
opposed to her set purpose and policy than to see
herself debarred from opportimities of expansion
and aggrandisement at the expense of her big but
feeble neighbour. Thus, both the language and the
manner in which the single demand of the fourth
Group was made, strongly remind us of the Rus-
sian tactics of 1895. The three-Power interven-
tion which Russia had engineered after the Chino-
Japanese War against the seizure by Japan of the
Liaotung peninsula was ostensibly undertaken for
the protection of the integrity and independence of
China. No one, however, seriously doubted that
the real purpose of the intervention was to keep the
Pacific door open for Russia herself. The occupa-
tion by Japan of the Liaotung peninsula would
blight all the roseate hopes that the Muscovite states-
men had entertained for an ice- free pprt in the
Far East. Three years later the fruit of the inter-
vention was reaped when Port Arthur and Talien-
wan were leased to Russia for a term of twenty-five
years. Following, perhaps, the same line of diplo-
macy, now Japan tried to force the declaration from
the Chinese Government that it would not lease or
cede any territory along the coast to a third Power,
only to make the field clear for herself !

From the standpoint of the Chinese Government,
the demand of the Fourth Group was a serious limi-

JAIPAN VERSUS CHINA' 65

tation of its sovereignty. Mr. Hector C Bywater,
the brilliant author of "Sea-Power in the Pacific:
A Study of American-Japanese Naval Problem,"
observed that "the presentation of such a demand
presumed a Japanese protectorship over Chinese ter-
ritory, and was therefore open to objection as it
stood." In the official statement which the Chinese
Government gave out apropos of the negotiation of
the Twenty-one Demands, it was pointed out that,
"as regards the single article of the Fourth Group
and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government
held that they were inconsistent with Chinese sov-
ereignty." The same view was shared by all' those
who have had the opportunity of examining the
Twenty-one Demands in their true light.

Aside from this ill-concealed attempt on the part
of Japan to assume a protectorship over Chinese
territory, there was much more behind it. While
it was difficult at the first glance to understand why
such a demand should be made upon the Chinese
Government, especially at the time when the whole
world was engaged in war, and when there was no
one Power in sight, but Japan herself, who would
ever dare ask China to cede or to lease any harbour,
bay, or island along her coast, it was comparatively
easy to see the real motive behind it. It should be
recalled that throughout the year 1914 there had
been rumours in the Far East that the United States
was invited by the Chinese Government to imdertake
the reorganisation of the Foochow Arsenal in the

66 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Fukien Province. The enterprise was, it was al-
leged, finally entrusted to Bethlehem Steel Company.
For the purpose of carrying out the said scheme, it
was deemed necessary that the Bethlehem Steel Com-
pany should be granted the lease of a harbour ad-
joining to the arsenal. The story was officially de-
nied, in Peking; Mr. John V. A. MacMurray, who
was then Secretary of the American Legation in
Peking, asserted that the story was entirely without
f oimdation. But the Japanese Government was very
much alarmed, and the Japanese people were equally
excited — so much so that they deemed it necessary
to extract from the Chinese Government an explicit
assurance that such a scheme was not to be under-
taken. The demand was the natural result. Al-
though phrased in a general language, that China
should not lease or cede any harbour or bay or island
along her coast, the demand aimed particularly at the
Fukien province.

That this was really the case is borne out by the
notes exchanged between China and Japan respecting
the Fukien province. "A report has reached me,"
said Mr. Hioki Eki, Japanese Minister in Peking,
"to the effect that the Chinese Government has the
intention of permitting foreign nations to establish,
on the coast of Fukien province, dock-yards, coaling
stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up
other military establishments; and also of borrow-
ing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the
above-mentioned establishments." The Japanese

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 6J

Minister asked a categorical assurance from the Qii-
nese Government. In reply, the Chinese Government
stated that it had no intention of setting up military
or naval establishment on the coast of Fukien prov-
ince.

Thus analysed, the pretext that the single demand
of the Fourth Group was made for the purpose of
maintaining the territorial integrity of China appears
in its true colour.

VIII

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS ANALYSED

—GROUP V

THE most drastic, outrageous, and derogatory
of China's sovereignty, in comparison with
which the Austrian demands to Serbia of
1914 paled almost into insignificance, was the Fifth
Group of the demands, which were not admitted by
the Japanese Government when the attention of
the Western Powers was first drawn to them, and
which were not included in the official commimica-
tion of the Japanese Government, replying to the in-
quiries of the great Powers regarding the nature and
the terms of the Twenty-one Demands. To say the
least, these demands, if granted, would have re-
duced China to a vassal of Japan, by making the
relations between the two countries similar to the
existing relations between Great Britain and Egypt,
or between Korea and Japan herself. Although
the Qiinese Government was forced to g^ve way in
the first four groups of demands, it stood absolutely
firm on the fifth, and declined to consider them on
the ground "that they were not proper subjects for
international negotiation, conflicting as they did with
the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of
other Powers, and the principle of equal opportim-

68

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 69

ity/' History knows of no combination of de-
mands more sinister in motive and more outrageous
in character than this Fifth Group, which Japan,
a friendly Power, had presented on China, another
friendly Power. And it may also be said that the
course which the Japanese Government had pur-
sued in concealing the demands of this group from
the knowledge of the Western Powers, is admittedly
one of mendacity and duplicity, for which history
of modem diplomacy has but few parallels, if any.
According to the demands in the Fifth Group,
the Chinese Government was to employ influential
Japanese advisers in political, financial, and mili-
tary affairs; to permit Japanese hospitals, churches
(Is there any Japanese church in China?) and
schools to lease and own land; to employ Japanese
officers for the administration of the police depart-
ment of important cities; to purchase from Japan
a fixed amount of mimitions of war, aside from
establishing an arsenal in China to be imder Japa-
nese control and management; "to grant to Japan
the right to construct a railway connecting Wu-
chang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line
between Nanchang and Hankow, and another line
between Nanchang and Chao-chow;" to pledge not
to use any foreign capital other than Japanese to
work mines, build railways, and construct harbour
works in the Fukien province ; and finally to permit
Japanese subjects to carry on missionary propaganda
for the dissemination of Buddishm in China.

70 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

A formidable set of demands, indeed. To say-
that they constituted a sufficient castes belli is to put
the case very mildly. Those who are at all ac-
quainted with the nature of Austrian demands on
Serbia, whose refusal to accept them in toto led to
the outbreak of the European War in August,
1914, will readily agree that the Japanese demands
on China, especially those of the Fifth Group, were
hundred times more drastic, and that a disastrous
war in the Far East was averted only by the ex-
tremely conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Govern-
ment.

A well-known writer on Chinese questions said :

"The real purpose of the Japanese demands be-
comes unalterably clear, for in this group we have
seen seven sketches of things designed to serve as the
coup de grace. Not only is a new sphere — Fukien
province — indicated; not only is the mid- Yangtze,
from the vicinity of Kiukiang, to serve as the ter-
minus for a system of Japanese railways, radiating
from the great river to the coasts of South China;
but the gleaming knife of the Japanese surgeon is to
aid the Japanese teacher in the great work of propa-
ganda; the Japanese monk and the Japanese police-
man are to be dispersed like skirmishers throughout
the land; Japanese arsenals are to supply all the
necessary arms, or failing that a special Japanese
arsenal is to be established; Japanese advisers are to
give the necessary advice in finance, in politics, in
every department — foreshadowing a complete and all

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 71

embracing political control. Never was a more sweep-
ing programme of supervision presented, and small
wonder if Chinese when they learnt of this climax
exclaimed that the fate of Korea was to be their
own." *

A more vicious assault upon Chinese sovereignty
cannot be imagined!

We shall not, in this connection, go into the de-
tails of the demands which are in direct conflict
with the principle of equal opportunity in China.
This aspect of the question is dealt with at some
length in "The Chino-Japanese Treaties of 1915,*' in
which an attempt is made to bring out the strongest
reasons why the 1915 treaties growing out of the
Twenty-one Demands should be null and void. We
need only to point out here that the proposal of joint
administration by China and Japan of the Chinese
police would be clearly an interference with the do-
mestic affairs of the Republic, and consequently an
infringement upon China's sovereignty. Besides
this, the demand for an engagement by the Chinese
Government to purchase a fixed amount of muni-
tions from Japan or to establish a Chino-Japanese
joint arsenal was such a clear encroachment of

*B. L. Putnam Weale, "The Fight for the Republic in
China.*' The same author gave this as his opinion: "Every
Chinese knew that, in the main, Group V. was simply a
repetition of the measures undertaken in Korea after the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905 as a forerunner to annexation;
and although obviously in the case of China no such rapid
surgery could be practised, the endorsement of Uhese measures
would have meant a virtual Japanese protectorate."

72 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

China's sovereignty that it was really diffictdt to
see how one Power could without cause make such
a demand upon another.* In respect to the appoint-
ment of advisers in political, financial, and military
affairs, the policy of the Qiinese Government, it may
be said, has always been similar to that which has
apparently guided the Japanese Government, appoint-
ing to positions of great importance the best quali-
fied and most able men irrespective of their nation-
ality. As a sovereign and independent nation, China
could not allow her national policy being dictated
to by an alien Power, no matter how desirous that
Power might be of "maintaining the general peace
in Eastern Asia and fiuther strengthening the
friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
between the two nations." For Japan to insist upon
the Chinese Government employing Japanese, and

♦The true significance of this demand can be best under-
stood if we quote here the despatch of M. Krupensky, Rus-
sian Ambassador at Tokio, to his Government, under llie date
of October 16, 1917. The Russian diplomat writes : "In reply-
to my question as to the credibility of the rumours alleging
that Japan is prepared to sell to tiie Chinese Government a
considerable quantity of arms and munitions, Viscount
Motono (then Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs), con-
firmed them, and added that the Peking Government had
promised not to use arms against the Southerners. It was
evident from the Minister's words, however, that this promise
possessed only the value of a formal justification of this sale,
infringing as the latter does the principle of non-intervention
in the internal Chinese feuds, proclaimed by Japan herself.
. , . It is most likely that the Japanese are aiming princi-
pally at obtaining the Privilege of rearming the entire Chinese
army, and at m/aking China dependent in the future on
Japanese arsenals and the supply of munitions from Japan.

\

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 73

Japanese alone, as political, financial, and military
advisers was to disregard the practical side of the
question, to say the least. In spite of her advanced
position in the family of nations, Japan has not yet
found it possible to dispense with the services of the
foreign advisers herself. She has a number of for-
eign advisers in her government service; and it is,
therefore, questionable whether she is at all in a
position to advise China.

The demand that Japan should be first consulted,
if China were to borrow foreign capital for the
purpose 6i working mines, building railways, and
constructing harbour works and dock-yards in the
Province of Fukien is easily understandable. It was
based on the fear, as has been pointed out in the
previous chapter, that the Chinese Government might
make use of American capital in setting up military
and naval establishments on the coast of the said
province. Japan has claimed special interest in the
province, on the ground of its geographical prox-
imity to Formosa, a Chinese island ceded to Japan
at the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese War in
1894-5. '^Geographical propinquity* might in cer-
tain cases create a special interest, but the position
which Japan has hitherto enjoyed in the Fukien
province is that of a neighbour, not of a protector.
Her demand, however, was nothing short of an
absolute right of vetoing any attempt on the part of
China to utilise the foreign capital to develop the
Fukien province. It would be, therefore, not only

74 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

a dexiifJ of equal opportunity, but also an unwar-
ranted limitation on China's sovereign rights.

Regarding the two articles relating to the ac-
quisition of land for Japanese schools, hospitals, and
churches, as well as the right of missionary propa-
ganda, we can do no better than to quote the Chinese
Official Statement, which defined the position of the
Chinese Government in a language at once concise
and comprehensive. These demands

"would have presented grave obstacles to the consoli-
dation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the
two people. The religions of the two countries are
identical and therefore the need for a missionary
propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese
does not exist. The natural rivalry between Chinese
and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend
to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas
Western missionaries live apart from the Chinese com-
munities among which they labour, Japanese monks
would live with the Chinese, and the similarity of
their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and
their habits of life would render it impossible to dis-
tinguish them for purposes of affording the protec-
tion which the Japanese Government would require to
be extended to them under the system of extraterri-
toriality now obtaining in China. Moreover, a gen-
eral apprehension exists among the Chinese people
that these peculiar conditions favouring conspiracies
for political purposes might be taken advantage of by
some imscrupulous Chinese."

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 75

The most significant feature of the demands of the
Fifth Group remains yet to be considered. This is
no other than the desire of the Japanese Govern-
ment to invade the British sphere of interest by de-
manding railway concessions .in the Yangtze Valley.
She demanded "the right of constructing a railway
connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang,
another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and
another between Nanchang and Chaochou." Un-
questionably, this demand for railway concessions
in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the existing
agreements between Qiina and Great Britain. It
would come into conflict first with the Shanghai-
Nanking-Ningpo Railway Agreement of March 6,
1908, Article XIX of which provided that if for-
eign capital were required to build the branch lines
of the said railway, preference should be given to
Great Britain (British and Chinese Corporation,
Limited). It would then conflict with the Nanking-
Hunan Railway Loan Agreement of March 31,
1914. Article II of the said agreement stipulated:
"The loan is designed . . . secondly for the con-
struction of a Government line of railway from
Nanking to Nanchang through Ning-kwo-fu and
Hwei-chou-fu, and with connection to Wu-hu and
Kuang-te-chow : and from Nanchang to Pinghsiang
to connect with the existing Government railway
from Pinghsiang to Chuchow." And thirdly, it may
be pointed out, the demand conflicted with certain
engagement which the Chinese Government had

76 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

made on August 24, 1914, giving preference to the
British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, for the
projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. "For
this reason," the Chinese Official Statement empha-
sised, "the Chinese Government found themselves
unable to consider the demand, though the Japa-
nese Minister, while informed of China's engage-
ments with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its
acceptance." Is Japan an ally of Great Britain, and
according to the terms of the alliance, is she not re-
quired to defend the common interests of both coun-
tries? The Japanese Minister in Peking could
not have pressed upon the Chinese Government for
acceptance of this demand without instructions from
TokioY and the Tokio Foreign Office could not have
been ignorant of the fact that the railway lines de-
manded had already been conceded to Great Britain.
The Chinese Government, faithful in its interna-
tional engagements, made it very clear that the de-
mand conflicted with its previous engagements with
Great Britain, and therefore cotdd not be granted.
After all, one is quite justified, with this fact in
view, in asking if Japan is really such a loyal ally
as she has claimed to be.

In this matter of railway concessions, Japan's
conscience was sorely touched. Realising that she
could not after all ignore the engagements which
the Chinese Government had already entered into
with Great Britain, Japan revised the language of

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 77

the demand so as to make it inoffensive. Thus, in
the list of revised demands, presented to the Chi-
nese Government, April 26, 1915, Japan suggested
that the demand for the railway concessions in the
Yangtze Valley should be made the subject of an
exchange of notes between the two countries. "If
it is clearly ascertained that other Powers have no
objection, China shall grant the said right to Japan."
In the meantime, however, "the Chinese Government
shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power,
before Japan comes to an understanding with the
other Power which is heretofore interested therein."
The right referred to here was that of financing the
construction of those railways mentioned in the
original demand.

In the ultimatum, it was stated that the Fifth
Group of demands was detached "from the present
negotiation" and that it would be discussed "sep-
arately in the future." The ultimatum was delivered
to the Chinese Government, at 3 p. m.. May 7, and
it was accepted tlie following day. The Japanese
Minister in Peking objected to the phraseology of
the Chinese note of acceptance and insisted that the
demands of the Fifth Group, except the one relating
to Fukien, which was to be made into an exchange
of notes, should be specifically reserved for futiu"e
negotiation. The Japanese Minister insisted that,
following the words "Group V" there should be in-
serted the qualifying phrase "postponed for later

78 THE TjWENTY-ONE DEMAKDS

negotiation." The result is that the Fifth Group
of demands remains to-day as "unfinished business,
to be taken up at a future date."

It may also be added here that the Japanese Gov-
ernment, in answer to the inquiries from the west-
cm Powers, failed to make public the demands of
the Fifth Group, and that when they became known,
the Japanese Grovemment referred to them merely
as "wishes," "requests for friendly consideration"
by China. In the statement issued by the Japanese
Government, May 7, they were referred to as "prop-
ositions relating to the solution of pending questions
and others." In answer to this tergiversation, the
Chinese Government in its official statement, made it
very clear that these demands of the Fifth Group
were presented as "demands," not as "wishes," "re-
quests," or "propositions." "The first four Groups
were each introduced by a preamble, but there was
no preamble or explanation to the Fifth Group. In
respect of the character of the demands in this
Group, however, no difference was indicated in the
document between them and those embodied in the
preceding Groups."

IX
A UNILATERAL NEGOTIATION

WHILE these demands were obviously not
proper subjects for international negotia-
tion, the Chinese Government, it is curi-
ous to say, consented, "in deference to the wishes of
the Japanese Government," to open negotiations "on
those articles which it was possible for China to
consider." The Japanese Minister in Peking, ow-
ing to his eagerness to bring the whole matter to a
successful conclusion before the world at large could
have any knowledge of it, pressed the Chinese Gov-
ernment to agree to a daily conference. This the
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs could not agree
to, as it would not give him sufficient time to study
the demands in entirety. And it was later mutually
agreed upon that two conferences were to be held
every week. "China approached the pending con-
ferences in a spirit of utmost friendliness," to quote
the Chinese official statement, "and with a determi-
nation to deal with all questions frankly and sin-
cerely. Before negotiations were actually com-
menced, the Japanese Minister raised many ques-
tions with regard to the number of delegates pro-
posed to represent China, and the number of con-
ferences to be held in eadi week, and the method

79

80 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAiNDS

of discussion. The Chinese Government, though its
views differed from those of the Japanese Minister,
3rielded in all these respects to his contentions, in
the hope of avoiding any delay in the negotiations.
The objections of the Japanese Minister to the cus-
tomary recording and signing of the minutes of each
conference, which the Chinese Government sug-
gested as a necessary and advisable precaution, as
well as one calculated to facilitate future reference,
were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese Govern-
ment retaliate in any way when in the course of
negotiations the Japanese Minister twice suspended
the conferences, obviously with the object of com-
pelling compliance with his views on certain points
at the time under discussion.'*

The first conference was held in the Chinese For-
eign Office in the afternoon of February 2, 1915,
when the entire affair was still a mystery to the
outside world. The Japanese Minister pressed for
immediate acceptance, in principle, of the Twenty-
one Demands en bloc. For this he advanced many
reasons, one of which was that if the demands were
accepted in principle at once. Count Okuma's posi-
tion, it is ridiculous to say, would be endangered.
That was, to be sure, an excellent argument for
Count Okuma, then Premier of Japan, but one nat-
urally fails to understand why China should sacri-
fice her sovereignty by acceding to these demands in
order merely to promote the worthy Count's politi-
cal career. Into the details of the negotiations we

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 81

do not propose to go, for they can be easily found
in the official statement given out by the Chinese
Government after the conclusion of the negotia-
tions (see appendix I). We only wish to show
the manner in which the negotiations had been con-
ducted, or more accurately, dictated by Japan. We
only want to point out the way whereby the Japa-
nese Government, to use its own language, was de-
termined to attain its ends by all means within its
power.

Beginning from February 2, two conferences were
regularly held each week between the Chinese Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister
in Peking. As has been said, the Japanese Minister
demanded the acceptance in principle of the entire
Twenty-one Demands. This was absolutely declined
by the Chinese Foreign Minister, who only ventured
to express a general opinion on such proposals as
were possible subjects for negotiation. On Febru-
ary 18, the Japanese Minister became more peremp-
tory in manner and in speech. He insisted that the
negotiations must be extended to cover the entire
set of demands.* Out of an earnest desire to bring

♦In this connection, it may be interesting to refer to the
fact that Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, at that time American Minister
in Peking, exerted his best effort to soften the demands.
Upon learning that the Japanese Minister became more per-
emptory at the conference held on February 18, he sent a
cable, inviting President Wilson's personal attention to the
proposals, "which affected the rights and legitimate prospects
of Americans in China." President Wilson, in a personal
letter to Dr. Reinsch under the date of February 8, and there-
fore already on the way to Peking, before Dr. Reinsch cabled,

82 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

about an early settlement of the entire affair,
the Chinese Government, while declining abso-
lutely to negotiate on the demands in the Fifth
Group, yielded to the Japanese wishes wherever
it could and consented to negotiate on those de-
mands which were compatible with China's sover-
eignty and her territorial integrity. The negotiations
between the two Governments were for a long time
going on apparently very smoothly. But at the con-
ference held on March 9, while still pressing for a
speedy acceptance in principle of the whole set of
demands, Mr. Hioki verbally notified the Chinese
Foreign Minister that unless a satisfactory settle-
ment were soon reached, Japan would be compelled
"to take steps that will surprise China and be un-
pleasant to Japan herself." This was, however, only
a threat made by the Japanese diplomat on his own
responsibility. On March 15, however, the same
diplomat, apparently under instructions from his
Government, conveyed to the Chinese Government
an expression of appreciation of the frankness and
sincerity of the Chinese representatives in the con-
duct of the negotiations. In the morning of March
17, Mr. Hioki fell down from his horse, and was

said in part: **I have had the feeling that any direct advice
in China, or any direct intervention on her behalf in the
present negotiations, would really do her more harm than
good, inasmuch as it would very likely provoke the jealousy
and excite the hostility of Japan, which would first be mani-
fested against China herself." For this reason, therefore,
President Wilson said: "For the present I am watching the
situation very carefully indeed, ready to step in at any point
where it is wise to do so."

JAiPAN VERSUS CHINA 83

hurt. As a result he was confined to his house for
several days. That the Chinese Government was
willing to expedite the negotiation and to meet the
desires of the Japanese Government was further il-
lustrated in the fact that, during the confinement
of the Japanese Minister, the negotiations were con-
tinued at the Japanese Legation instead of at the
Chinese Foreign Office. It was sincerely hoped
by the Chinese Government that, in view of the
great concessions already made by China, the Japa-
nese Government would see a way of receding from
its position on other points. But this hope for a
change of heart by Japan was all in vain. With the
conference of April 17, further negotiations were
suspended by the Japanese Minister, and they were
not resumed until April 26, when he siuprised the
Chinese Government with a new list of Twenty-
four Demands (which see the appendix D). This
he said, was the final proposal of his Government,
and he requested the Chinese Government to accord
its acceptance without delay. The Japanese diplo-
dat was kind enough to add, however, that the leased
territory of Kiaochow would be restored to China
"at an opportune time in the future and under proper
conditions," if the Chinese Government would agree
to the new list of Twenty-four Demands without
modification.

The set of the Twenty-one Demands was already
formidable enough and far more than the Chinese
Government could undertake to consider. Now to

84 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAINDS

add three more to the original set was to fill China's
cup of bitterness to overflow. The new list of de-
mands was ostensibly a revision of the original, rep-
resenting modifications and concessions. But as a
matter of fact, "these amended demands were con-
cessions more in phraseology than spirit, by making
it easier for China to accept them." The pill was
sugarcoated a little, but that it was still the same
bitter medicine was evident. To this new list of
Twenty- four Demands, the Chinese Government re-
plied on May 1, 1915, in a concise memorandimi
read to Mr. Hioki by the Chinese Minister of For-
eign Affairs. With this reply Japan was not at
all satisfied, for it was "contrary to the expectations
of the Imperial Government." As an indication of
dissatisfaction, the conditional offer of restoring
the leased territory to China was withdrawn. The
Japanese Minister intimated, as he had intimated
once before, that if the Chinese Government should
further refuse to accept the new list of Twenty-
four Demands without modification, Japan would
have to resort to the most drastic measures. "Upon
receiving this intimation the Chinese Government,
inspired by the conciliatory spirit which had been
predominant from the very beginning of the nego-
tiations and desirous of avoiding any possible rup-
ture in the relations of the two countries, made a
supreme effort to meet the situation, and represented
to the Japanese Government that it would recon-
sider its position and make another attempt to find

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 85

a solution that would be more satisfactory to Japan,
in respect to those articles which China had de-
clared could not be taken up for consideration, but
to which Japan attached great importance."

At the same time, it must be clearly borne in mind,
the events in Peking and Tokyo were moving with
unusual rapidity, and the diplomatic tension in the
capital of the Chinese Republic then was quite com-
parable to the famous "twelve days" before the out-
break of the War in Europe in August, 1914. Those
who were in China then and breathed the foul at-
mosphere of Japan's military diplomacy instinctively
felt that something terrible was to come about. It
is easy to recall that at an early stage of the dis-
cussions of the Twenty-one Demands, a Japanese
force of 30,000 strong was send to China, ostensi-
bly for the relief of the Tsingtao and Manchurian
garrisons. It was generally conceded that the move-
ment was intended as a military demonstration
against China, although the Japanese War Depart-
ment suavely explained that the strengthening of
Japan's garrisons at different parts in China was
"merely a matter of military routine." On March
22, five hundred infantry, some artillery, and a
squadron of cavalry, arrived at Fangtze, in Shan-
tung, from Japan. Three thousand fresh troops ar-
rived at Mukden, about the same time, where they
were supposedly to guard the railway station, and
three thousand more arrived at Dairen from Japan
for no definite purpose. Tsi-nan-fu, the capital of

86 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAINDS

Shantung province, suddenly became a scene of
Japan's military activity. In one of the conferences
the Japanese Minister was asked for an explana-
tion of the arrival in China of such a large num-
ber of Japanese troops. The Japanese diplomat
would not say that the troops were reliefs, but he
hoped that their presence would influence a speedy
and satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations of the
Twenty-one Demands. "The Japanese Minister
stated at the conference, in reply to a direct ques-
tion as to when the retiring troops would be with-
drawn, that this would not be done "until the nego-
tiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclu-
sion." On March 23, the Chinese Government ad-
dressed an "amicably expressed" request to the
Japanese Government for an explanation for this
sudden influx of Japanese troops in China. The
Chinese Government was told that "the despatch of
troops to South Manchuria and Shantung," to use
Baron Kato's own words, "is really for the relief of
the Japanese garrisons, only a little earlier this year
(1915) than previously." This statement might be
a good explanation for the sudden despatch of troops
to China for the relief of the Japanese garrisons
several months in advance of the usual time, but
it did not account for the fact that the retiring gar-
risons, for whose relief the new troops were sent,
did not withdraw. Inasmuch as the number of
Japanese garrisons in Peking, Tien-tsin and along
the South Manchurian Railway, was fixed by treaty

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 87

terms with China, Japan had certainly no right
to increase them at her sweet will without previous
consultation with the Chinese Government.

That this sudden increase of Japanese troops in
China was a minatory step taken in order to show
the Chinese Government what might be expected
in case of its further refusal to accept the Japa-
nese demands was understood by men in the street.
Its meaning could not be mistaken. The Chinese
Government, on the one hand, protested in vain
against this military demonstration which caused
much excitement, indignation and alarm among the
Chinese people, and on the other hand, it had to
caution the people to remain calm and patient, so
as to evert a rupture with Japan and to proceed
smoothly with the negotiations which were thus
rendered immensely difficult by the increase and
promiscuous presence of Japanese troops in Chinese
cities. It must be admitted that diplomatic negotia-
tion under such circumstances was nothing more
than a unilatemal affair. It was not at all negotia-
tion; it was coercion, dictation. To give its true
character, we beg to quote the excellent characteri-
sation given by the Chinese delegates at the Peace
Conference at Paris :

"It was a negotiation in which the number and vir-
tually the personnel of China's representatives were
dictated to her. It was a negotiation in which Japan
refused to have official minutes of the proceedings

88 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAINDS

kept as proposed by China, with the result that the
Chinese and Japanese representatives diflfered in their
respective records of important declarations made by
the latter, and, on basis of these diflferences, the Japa-
nese Government in its ultimatum accused the Chi-
nese Government of 'arbitrarily nullifying* statements
alleged to have been made — ^but in fact never made —
by the senior Chinese representative. It was a nego-
tiation in the course of which — ^these are the words
of the Chinese official statement issued at the time —
'the Japanese Minister twice suspended the confer-
ences, obviously with the object of compelling compli-
ance with his views on certain points at the time under
discussion! In a word, it was a negotiation in which
Japan dominated and dictated the course and the
terms of discussion."

As we have pointed out above, events in Peking
then moved with unusual speed. Swiftly following
the Chinese reply of May 1, with which the Japa-
nese Government was not satisfied, "adequate steps"
were taken to bring China to accept the demands
nolens volens. Naturally, more troops were des-
patched to China, particularly to Manchtuia, Shan-
tung, North China, and Central China; and more
war ships were ordered to Chinese waters. On May
3, it was decided in a cabinet meeting in Tokyo that
an ultimatum should be issued. On May 4, the
Genro sat in session for four hours to pass on the
ultimatum. On the same day, the Kokusai News
Agency, the semi-official agency of the Japanese

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 89

Government, reported from Tokyo that "further dis-
cussion or even the suggestion of more concessions
to China's sensibilities would be incompatible with
Japan's national dignity." On May 5, martial law ^
was proclaimed in Kwantung peninsula, and the -
Japanese consul at Chefoo ordered all Japanese resi-
dents in that city to be prepared to leave in two '
days. On May 6, the Mikado sanctioned the ultima- ;
tum, which was duly cabled to the Japanese Minister
in Peking. In the evening, the Japanese diplomat
informed the Chinese Foreign Office that the long
heralded ultimatum had arrived, and requested the
Chinese Government to reconsider its position. On
May 7, at 10 : 00 a. m. the main body of the second
Japanese squadron left Sasebo for "an unknown,
destination." The battleship Ikoma of 13,750 tons,
with Rear- Admiral Yamaya in command, left Kure
for a Chinese port. Four Japanese men-of-war of
small tonnage were sent to Shanghai from Formosa,
And the battleships Kurama and Chiktmta and four-
teen destroyers were also given order to hold them-
selves in readiness to act at an hour's notice. With
these military and naval forces in readiness for ac-
tion, the Japanese Minister, accompanied by his staff,
quietly called at the Chinese Foreign Office at 3 : 00
p. m. on the same day, and formally presented to
the Chinese Foreign Minister the ultimatum. Con-
trary to the diplomatic usage, it was written in
Japanese and not accompanied by a Chinese text.
On May 8, a joint meeting of the Cabinet of the

90 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMA^NI>S

Chinese Republic, the Council of State, and the
Military leaders in the capital, was held in Presi-
dent's Palace, to consider the Japanese ultimatum
which declared that "if no satisfactory reply is re-
ceived before or at the designated time (6:00 p.
m.. May 9, 1915), the Japanese Government will
take steps they deem necessary." With President
Yuan in the chair, the joint meeting lasted more
than four hours. After a long and careful consider-
ation, it was finally decided to accept the ultimattmi
"with a view to preserving the peace in the Far
East." The Japanese Minister was asked to appoint
a day to call at the Foreign Office "to make the
literary improvement of the text and sign the agree-
ment as soon as possible." This was done on May
25, 1915.

But why an ultimatum? it may be asked. The
case for such a drastic step was altogether too thin.*

♦The Japan Chronicle, in an editorial entitled "Domestic
Politics and the Twenty-one Demands," published in its
weekly edition of June 9, 1921, throws a flood of light as to
the reasons for which the ultimatum was conceived. The said
editorial was based on another published in the Herald of
Asia by its editor, Mr. Zumoto, a man who "has the courage
of his opinions." The Japan Chronicle editorial reads:

'*Mr. Zumoto, the veteran editor of the Herald of Asia, has
more than once shown that he has the courage of his opinions
even when they are against his countrymen, and in the latest
issue of his journal he once again sets forth views which are
not likely to increase his popularity in official circles. Dis-
cussing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 Mr. Zumoto notes
that when Japan sent her ultimatum to China regarding ac-
ceptance of the Treaty she waived Group V., which contained
the most outrageous claims on Chinese sovereignty, 'a pro-
cedure which at the moment excited much surprise and
comment in diplomatic circles in Peking and elsewhere, for

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 91

On what could the ultimatum be based? Could it
be on the fact that the Chinese Government had de-
clined to grant proprietary rights in Manchuria and
Mongolia to a nation which had no shadow of reason
in asking for them, or that the Chinese Government
preferred to buy its own mimitions of war and
choose its own advisers on the strength of their

since the principal obstacles had been removed there was no
necessity to resort to an ultimatum to secure China's agree-
ment/ Mr. Zumoto continues:

"*The truth is that the whole negotiations were conducted
by the Okuma Government with a view to their possibly
favourable impressions upon the domestic opinion in connec-
tion with the general election upon the issue of which de-
pended its own fate. It was so arranged that the news of
the presentation of the ultimatum was spread throughout the
length and breadth of the country only a few days before the
date of the election, the obvious purpose being to create an
impression that the Empire was confronted with a grave crisis
in its international relations calling for a united support of
those in power. To strengthen this impression the Cabinet
even went to the length of giving out orders for mobilising
a couple of army divisions, a procedure which every well-
mformed observer knew what not at all necessary. These
skilful manceuvrings had the desired effect upon the popular
imagination, and ti&e Cabinet was saved by a large majority
at the polls.'

"Mr. Zumoto is not quite right in his facts. The General
Election took place on March 25th and the ultimatum was
telegraphed to China not before the election but more than
a month after, — on May 6th. At the same time, Mr. Zumoto*s
statement that the demands on China were directed by political
exigencies in Japan is of interest. It is a view which was
advanced by us several times in the Chronicle and although
resented by the Japanese papers, it also found expression
among Japanese of the more thoughtful kind. Now that such
a keen observer of Japanese politics as Mr. Zumoto confirms
it, there remains little to be said on the other side. At the
same time, it throws a very sinister light on Japan's foreign
policy. The Japanese place great stress on 'sincerity.' What
amount of 'sinceritsr* is to be found among statesmen who
enter upon an aggressive foreign policy merely to establish
their political position at home?

92 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMA!NDS

qualification but without regard to their nationality ?
Could it be on the fact that the Chinese Government
had put forward legitimate proposals in regard to
Shantung or that it had failed to appreciate Japan's
conditional offer of restoring the Kiao-chow leased
territory? If China had done these things, or even
more, who could accuse her of acting otherwise than
what she was perfectly entitled to? Just a few days
before the actual presentation of the ultimatum by
the Japanese Minister, the North-China Daily News,
a British newspaper in Shanghai, in an editorial of
May 4, expressed its doubt that Japan would ever
resort to such a step. "We have never shared that
view, first because we refuse to believe that Japan
would be so false to the spirit and letter of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance as to commit an open act of piracy
on China; secondly, because we are certain that
Japan would never be so blind to her own interests
as to quarrel simultaneously with Great Britain,
France, America, and Russia." And two days later,
May 6, in another editorial, when the threatened
ultimatum was already in the hands of the Japanese
Minister and was about to be presented to the Chi-
nese Government, the belief was expressed that
Japan would not take such a drastic step. "We
repeat," says the editorial, "until the worst is indeed
proved to have happened, we decline to believe that
Japan can be so faithless to her Ally, Great Britain,
as to meditate any real harm to the integrity of the
one (China) or the rights of the other (Great Brit-

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 93

ain). . . . The word ultimatum has. an ugly soimd,
and at the worst it means simply, 'Do this or I will
force you to do so/ But this is altogether too
outrageous to suppose Japan's intention is so brutal
as this. . . . Germany might act thus, it is felt
nothing else would be expected of her: but not
Japan." We greatly admire the profound faith
which the leading British journal in the Far East
then had in the Japanese Government, and we are
sorry that it was sadly disappointed. It was never-
theless good time to learn that Prussianism was not
indigeneous in Europe nor was ultimatum an ex-
clusively Germany luxury.

Throughout the negotiations of 1915, 24 meetings •
were held at the Chinese Foreign Office and lasting
over more than three months — not a single Euro-
pean Power raised a voice of protest. This might be
due to the war which had absorbed all the necessary ;
time and attention of the European chancelleries.
The question in regard to the Twenty-one Demands
was raised in the British Parliament and the French
Chamber of Deputies, but beyond the usual parlia-
mentary tergiversation nothing of importance took
place. The United States, then the only Power not. ^^
yet involved in the war, and, therefore, more or less
in a position to check the Japanese encroachment
upon China, did nothing more than making an in-
nocuous declaration at Washington and filing an
official note to both the Chinese and the Japanese
Governments. The note was despatched on May 15,

94 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

a week after the acceptance by the Chinese Govern-
ment of the Japanese ultimatum. It was, however,
said at the time that the declaration of the United
States on May 7, was in some way responsible for
the temporary withdrawal by Japan of the fifth
group of the demands which were not included in
the ultimatum but which were postponed for later
negotiation.

X

CONCLUSION

HERE we have before us the complete story
of the Twenty-one Demands. Thos who
have followed the above analysis and the
tortuous course of negotiation, and those who pre-
fer to examine the original demands, which can be
found in the appendices, can judge for themselves
as to their character and significance. It is now
quite plain that they constitute a carefully studied
and analysed economic and political programme
which Japan, in her guise as a world Power, has
meant to carry out in China in the time to come.
At the very first glance, the Twenty-one Demands
seem to be so many outrageous attacks upon the
sovereignty of China, unwarranted, but perhaps not
premeditated ; for no one Power can, with any sense
of due regard for international decency, press upon
another Power, not an enemy but an acknowledged
friend, demands of this character. A more careful
examination of them reveals, however, the truth that
they sum up Japan's Chinese policy, not unlike in
principle to the one adopted by her in Korea during \
the short period preceding the extinction of Korean \
independence. Or, as one English writer has put it, '
the Twenty-one Demands constitute "a list designed

95

96 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAiNDS

I to satisfy every present and future need of Japanese
; policy and to reduce China to a state of vassalage."
When we go behind the real motives which has
apparently prompted the Japanese Government, not
only in presenting the Twenty-one Demands on
^ China, but also in many other attempts at the domi-
\ nation of China, we can readily see that the motives
i I are not merely political, but also economic in nature.
' ; In other words, the Japanese Government has been
'. actuated as much by political considerations as by
: economic motives, seeking, under the influence of
the iron hand of military men at home, political
i fruits in China, and trying at the same time to ap-
pease their hankerings by material benefits, the value
of which can be instantly realised, even by men who
think only in the terms of empire-building, conquest,
and expansion. "The realisation that she was fast
approaching the limit of her resources, the knowl-
edge that her rapidly growing population was ever
pressing on the margin of her surplus resources,
the consciousness that the heavy burden of taxation
on her people could be lifted only by the increase of
her wealth elsewhere, and the necessity of seeking
new fields in which the great energy of her people
could have an outlet along agricultural and economic
lines, all combined to direct her policy to the conti-
nent. And the continent meant China."

And because of the immense amount of natural re-
sources at her disposal, China or the domination of
China, economically and politically, becomes the na-

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 97

tional goal of sixty millions of tax-burdened Japa-
nese. In China and her great wealth, Japan has seen
the opportunity of correcting by a forced agreement
what geography and nature have denied her. Japan ■
has done that in Korea, and she has attempted to '
repeat it in China. Whether or not Japan can sue- :
ceed in China as she has succeeded in Korea is an-;
other question. But this domination of the Chi-
nese natural resources is Japan's paramoimt object.
As we have already referred to in the above, both ;
Baron Makino and Viscount Uchida gave it as their ';
conviction that Japan's economic existence would
depend largely upon the rich resources of China.
On the other hand, the more reasonable view will
be this, that Japan can purchase, and very easily too,
all she needs from China. Being the richer of the
two, China can be the seller, and Japan, being the
poorer, ought to be the buyer. This arrangement
seems to be of business nature, and promises to be
of mutual benefit. But for Japan to force conces-
sions from the Chinese Government with a view to
controlling and monopolising them, to the exclu-
sion of all others, and in a way that is obviously
beneficial to Japan but detrimental to China, is too
much like the proverbial knight in the Chinese legend
who despoils the rich only to help himself.

Now to return once more to the Twenty-one De-
mands. Realising as we have realised the serious
^import of this formidable set of demands, and the
multiple complications which were bound to arise

98 THE TWENTY-ONE DEMAlNDS

from the acceptance of them by China, we are really
at a loss to understand how the Chinese Government
could bring itself in 1915 to negotiate them with the
Japanese Minister. A great majority of them, if
not all, were of such a preposterous nature that no
nation, which is in a position to defend its own in-
terests and rights, could entertain even for a single
moment. China was, of course, not in a position
Ihen, and is not now, to defend her own rights and
interests. But this is not a strong excuse for her
yielding to force majeure. Our wonder, therefore,
is not that Japan had made such demands, for,
driven somewhat by the economic necessities con-
fronting her and animated by the desire for further-
ing her imperialistic ambitions bom in three vic-
torious wars (first against China, second against
Russia and third against Germany), Japan would
make such demands later if she had not made them
then. Our wonder is that the Chinese Government,
anxious for its own interests and jealous of its own
rights, could be coerced to consider and negotiate
such demands which were not proper subjects for
international negotiations at all. If the alternative
to refusal to negotiate or to accept was war, then in
. that case China would go into the war not without
a cause. China's defeat would be predetermined;
but it is questionable whether she could be called
upon to accede to the terms of peace more onerous
than the Twenty-one Demands.

The acceptance by the Chinese Government of the

JAPAN VERSUS CHINA 99

ultimatum and the subsequent conclusion of the so-
called Chino- Japanese treaties of 1915 embodying
the majority of the Twenty-one Demands seemed to
have brought to an end the most unsavory chapter of
the history of diplomatic relations between Japan
and China. The whole transaction, in view of its
serious results most fruitful of difficulties upon the
international relations in the Far East in the future,
cannot be properly regarded, however, as a closed
business. It is questionable that China's compliance
with the Japanese ultimatum served upon her under
the threat of war, and her subsequent signature to
the treaties and notes of May 25, 1915, can be re-
garded as an estoppel which prevents her from re-
opening the question. The very fact that the
Japanese Government has repeatedly attempted to
persuade the Chinese Government to negotiate on
the Shantimg question, which is presumed to have
been disposed of in accordance with the terms of
the treaties and notes of 1915 is a clear indication
that even Japan herself cannot refuse to recognise
them in the nature of an imclosed business. Admit-
tedly, the whole question apropos of the Twenty-
one Demands requires judicial reconsideration, not
only in the interest of future cordial relations be-
tween Japan and China, but also in view of the
rights and privileges of the other treaty Powers in
China which have been vitally affected by the de-
mands. China brought up the question at the Peace
Conference at Versailles, but it was disposed of as

j

100 THE iTWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

most questions at the Conference were disposed of
according to preconceived and prearranged ways
and understandings. It has since been the avowed
intention of the Chinese Government to submit the
question to the League of Nations, although there
has been no official statement on the subject The
meeting in Washington of nine Powers to consider
questions relating to armament and to the Pacific
and the Far East may furnish an excellent occasion
for a judicial revision of the Twenty-one Demands.
Ift another book, "The Chino- Japanese Treaties of
May 25, 1915," are given the reasons for which the
said treaties should be made null and void. Speak-
ing metaphorically, the Twenty-one Demands were
the flowers, while the Chino-Japanese treaties of
1915 were the fruits. Like the "forbidden apple"
of Eden, the fruits of the year 1915 cannot be en-
joyed by Japan without seriously menacing the
peace and tranquillity of the political firmament of
the Far East.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

IN considering the Twenty-one Demands, we must
not lose sight of two most interesting and sig-
nificant incidents of Japan's internal politics:
one was the resolution introduced by Mr. Kei
Hara, formerly leader of the Opposition Party, and
Premier of Japan, and the other was the resigna-
tion from the Chuseikai by Mr. Kiroku Hayashi,
professor of International Politics in Keio Univer-
sity and M. P. for Kugawa Prefecture. Both were
events of significance from the point of view of
Japan's internal politics, and both arose in connec-
tion with the Twenty-one Demands.

NOTE I

A vote of want of confidence was introduced in
the Japanese House of Representatives June 2, 1915,
against Baron Kato, then Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, in connection with the negotiations with China
on the Twenty-one Demands. It was introduced by
Mr. Kei Hara, president of the Sei3rukai; Mr. Ki
Inukai, leader of the Kokimiinto; Mr. Hajime Ma-
toda, Mr. Kunisuke Okazaki, Mr. Takejiro Toko-
nami, Mr. Tsuneyemon Murano, Mr. Heikiehi Ogu-
wai of the Seiyukai; Mr. Naochiko Seki, of the
Kikuminto, and Mr. Kinya Sakomoto, of the Inde-

101

102 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

pendents. It took the form of a resolution and ran
as follows:

"The negotiations conducted by the present cabinet
with China were always conducted wrongly, injured
the friendly relations between the two countries,
brought the Powers' suspicion upon us, and only
served to disgrace the honour of the Empire. The
undersigned recognise that the negotiations not only
failed to insure the foundation of peace in the Far
East, but they have even left causes of future trouble.
The cabinet Ministers in charge should bear the re-
sponsibility for the negotiations and resign."

The resolution was brought up at the regular sit-
ting of the House, June 3, and was upheld by the
combined forces of the Seiyukai, Kokuminto and
some of the Pure Independents, against the three
Government parties, the Rikken Doshikai, and the
Independents.

NOTE II

Mr. Kiroku Hayashi, professor of International
Politics in Keio University and M. P., for Kugawa
Prefecture, left the Chuseikai for the reasons made
public in an interview with a representative of the
Japan Advertiser. Mr. Hayashi explained:

"My relations with the party were somewhat
strained before the break as a result of the 'two divi-
sion' question. I hesitated to leave the party sooner

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES -103

on account of my personal connections with Mr.
Ozaki, the Minister of Justice, but upon the late de-
mands on China, I deem it most important, not be-
cause I am a lecturer at the Keio University but I
owe it as a duty to the nation as one of its citizens.
No sacrifices to the party ideals can be made and
since I cannot refrain from setting forth my views
my only course was to hand in my resignation."

!
J

Asked as to his views upon the demands, Pro-
fessor Hayashi replied :

"We all know that the most important part of the
demands were the 'fifth' i.e., the so-called 'desires.*
All questions in the Diet have been. Why was not the
fifth group included when the ultimatum was sent?
I do not agree with the questioners or with Baron
Kato. I want to ask, Why was such abominable de-
mands in the first place framed by the Cabinet? Any
commonsense man can see that China will never
agree to such; it is absolutely an insult to our neigh-
bour's sovereignty, and China's only course was to
refuse, in order to 'save face.' Those desires if ac-
cepted were, in other words, that China should con-
sent to be a protectorate of Japan. To say we tried
to bind the two nations closer is as absurd as to say
the moon is green.

"Another question I wish to set forth is. Why was
not the fifth group made known to the Power when
the others were being made? If the Minister thought
that China would keep such a delicate question secret,
he must be considered as raw in the art of diplomacy.

104 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Keeping it a secret was only to be found out and
to be embarrassed. If such were the desires of the
Cabinet and if they were to open up China, they
ought to have done it with a firm determination to
have her consent by all means if Japan were to up-
hold her name and respect.

"Such is my view of the demands ; to have thought
that China was to negotiate secretly is a grave error;
it is like stealing a pair of bells with one's ears shut.
As to the other demands there need be no question
since those are natural' consequences and everybody
foresaw them. Those demands do not infringe the
integrity of China nor the 'open door' policy."

The interviewer further questioned him as to
his opinion of the retrocession of Tsingtau.

"Upon this case, I believe it only reasonable to have
it returned to China upon certain conditions."

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS HANDED AT TOKYO ON DECEMBER 3, 1914,
BY BARON KATO, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO
MR. HIOKI, JAPANESE MINISTER IN PEKING, IN
CONNECTION WITH THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS AND
OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED AT TOKYO, JUNE 9, 1915

In order to provide for the readjustment of affairs
consequent on the Japan-German War and for the
purpose of ensuring a lasting peace in the Far East
by strengthening the position of the Empire, the
Imperial Government have resolved to approach the
Chinese Government with a view to conclude treaties
and agreements mainly along the lines laid down
in the first four Groups of the appended proposals
(the Twenty-one Demands). Of these, the first
Group relates to the settlement of the Shantung ques-
tion, while the second Group has for its chief aim
the defining of Japan's position in South Manchuria
and Eastern' Inner Mongolia, that is to say, securing
at this time from the Chinese Government full recog-
nition of Japan's natural position in these regions
absence of which has hitherto been the cause of vari-
ous questions tending to estrange the feelings of the
two peoples towards each other. The object of the
third Group is to safeguard the best interest of the
Han-Yeh-Ping Company, with which Japanese capi-
talists are closely identified. It will thus be seen that
there is nothing especially new in our proposals em-

105

106 APPENDICES

bodied in the foregoing three Groups, while as regards
the fourth Group, it is only intended to emphasise the
principle of China's territorial integrity, which has
been so often declared by the Imperial Government.

BeKeving it absolutely essential, for strengthening
Japan's position in Eastern Asia as well as for pres-
ervation of the general interests of that region, to
secure China's adherence to the foregoing proposals,
the Imperial Government are determined to attain
this end by all means within their power. You see,
therefore, requested to use your best endeavour in
the conduct of the negotiations, which are hereby
placed in your hands.

As regards the proposals contained in the fifth
Group, they are presented as the wishes of the Im-
perial Government. The matters which are dealt with
under this category are entirely different in character
from those which are included in the first four
Groups. An adjustment, at this time, of these mat-
ters some of which have been pending between the
two countries, being nevertheless highly desirable for
the advancement of the friendly relations between
Japan and China as well as for safeguarding their
common interests, you are also requested to exercise
your best efforts to have our wishes carried out

It is very likely that in the course of these negotia-
tions the Chinese Government desire to find out the
attitude of the Imperial Government on the question
of the disposition of the leased territory of Kiaochow
Bay. If the Chinese Government will accept our pro-
posals as above-stated, the Imperial Government may,
with due regard to the principle of China's territorial

APPENDICES 107

integrity and in the interest of the friendship of the
two countries, consider the question with a view to
restoring the said territory to China, in the event of
Japan's being given free hand in the disposition
thereof as the result of the coming peace conference
between Japan and Germany. As, however, it will be
absolutely necessary, in restoring the said territory to
China, to lay certain conditions such as the opening
of the territory for foreign trade, establishment of a
Japanese settlement, etc., you will ask for further in-
structions when you propose to declare to the Chinese
Government the willingness of the Imperial Govern-
ment to consider the question.

APPENDIX B

japan's original demands

Translations of Documents Handed to His Excel-
lency the President, Ytum-Shih-Kai, by His Excel-
lency Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, on Ja/nuary
18, 1915.

The Japanese Government and the Qiinese Gov-
ernment being desirous of maintaining the general
peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the
friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing
between the two nations agree to the following
articles :

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to
give full assent to all matters upon which the Japa-
nese Government may hereafter agree with the Ger-
man Government relating to the disposition of all
rights, interests and concessions, which Germany, by
virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation
to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that
within the Province of Shantung and along its coast
no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third
Power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to
Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow
to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.

108

APPENDICES 109

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by herself as soon as possible certain impor-
tant cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as
Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are
to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

S

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, since the Chinese Government has always ac-
knowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree
to the following articles:

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually
agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and
Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchurian
Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be
extended to the period of 99 years.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to
lease or own land required either for erecting suitable
buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside
and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufac-
ture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant
to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall
be decided upon jointly.

Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in

110 APPENDICES

respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein bdow
the Japanese Government's consent shall be first ob-
tained before action is taken:

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject
of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan
with a third Power for the purpose of building a rail-
way in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(&) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third
Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if
the Chinese Government employs political, financial
or military advisers or instructors in South Man-
churia or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Grov-
emment shall first be consulted.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the
control and management of the Kirin-Changchun
Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Gov-
ernment for a term of 99 years dating from the sign-
ing of this Agreement.

Ill

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyeh-
ping Company, have close relations with each other at
present and desiring that the common interests of the
two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following
articles :

Article 1, The two Contracting Parties mutually
agree that when the opportune moment arrives the
Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern
of the two nations and they further agree that with-

APPENDICES 111

out the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by
her own act dispose of the rights and property of
whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the
said Company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all
mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the
Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without
the consent of the said Company, to be worked by
other persons outside of the said Company ; and fur-
ther agrees that if it is desired to carry out any un-
dertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or
indirectly aflFect the interests of the said Company, the
consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment with the object of eflFectively preserving the ter-
ritorial integrity of China agree to the following spe-
cial article :

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or
lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island
along the coast of China.

V

Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall
employ influential Japanese as advisers in political,
financial and military affairs.

Article 2, Japanese hospitals, churches and schools
in the interior of China shall be granted the right of
owning land.

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government
and the Chinese Government have had many cases of

112 APPENDICES

dispute between Japanese and Qiinese police to settle
cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for
this reason necessary that the police departments of
important places (in China) shall be jointly admin-
istered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police de-
partments of these places shall employ numerous Japa-
nese, so that they may at the same time help to plan
for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4, China shall purchase from Japan a fixed
amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or
more) or what is needed by the Chinese Government
or that there shall be established in China a Sino-
Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical
experts are to be employed and Japanese material to
be purchased.

Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right
of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with
Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nan-
chang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang
and Chaochou.

Article 6, If China needs foreign capital to work
mines, build railways and construct harbour-works
(including dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien,
Japan shall be first consulted.

Article 7, Qiina agrees that Japanese subjects shall
have the right of missionary propaganda* in China.

* Refers to preaching Buddhism.

APPENDIX C

THE INCORRECT VERSION OF JAPAN'S DEMANDS AS COM-
MUNICATED BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE
OTHER POWERS IN RESPONSE TO THEIR INQUIRIES

I. In relation to the Province of Shantung :

1. Engagement on the part of China to con-
sent to all matters that may be agreed upon
between Japan and Germany with regard
to the disposition of all rights, interests and
concessions, which in virtue of treaties or
otherwise Germany possesses in relation to
the Province of Shantung.

2. Engagement not to alienate or lease upon
any pretext the Province of Shantung or
any portion thereof and any island lying
near the coast of the said province.

3. Grant to Japan the right of construction of
a railway connecting Qiif u or Ltmgkow and
the Tsinan-Kiaochow railway.

4. Addition of open marts in the Province of
Shanttmg.

II. In relation to South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia.

1. Extension of the terms of the lease of
Kwangtung, the South Manchuria Railway,
and the Antung-Mukden Railway.

2. (A) Acquisition by the Japanese of the
right of residence and ownership of land.

m

114 APPENDICES

(B) Grant to Japan of the mining rights of
mines specified by Japan.

3. Obligation on the part of China to obtain in
advance the consent of Japan if she grants
railway concessions to any third Power, or
procures the supply of capital from any
Power for railway construction or a loan
from any other Power on the security of
any duties or taxes.

4. Obligation on the part of China to consult
Japan before employing advisers or tutors
regarding political, financial or military
matters.

5. Transfer of the management and control of
the Kirin-Changchun Railway to Japan.

III. Agreement in principle that, at an opportune
moment in the future, the Hanyehping Com-
pany should be placed under Japanese and
Chinese co-operation.

IV. Engagement in accordance with the principle
of the maintenance of the territorial integrity
of China, not to alienate or lease any ports and
bays on, or any island near, the coast of China.

APPENDIX D

japan's revised demands

Japan's Revised Demands on China, twenty-four in
all, presented April 26, 1915,

GROUP I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, being desirous of maintaining the general peace
in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly
relations and good neighbourhood existing between the
two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give
full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese
Government may hereafter agree with the German
Government, relating to the disposition of all rights,
interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue
of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the
Province of Shantung.

Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that within the
Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory
or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under
any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that
as regards the railway to be built by China herself
from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the
Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing
to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-

115

116 APPENDICES

Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capital-
ists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 4, The Chinese Government engages, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by China herself as soon as possible certain
suitable places in the Province of Shantung as CcMn-
mercial Ports.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes.)

The places which ought to be opened are to be
chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the
Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must
be consulted before making a decision.

GROUP II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, with a view to developing their economic rela-
tions in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia, agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually
agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny
and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and
the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to
99 years.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes.)

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall
expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The
date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to
China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic
or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchurian
Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed by China
after 36 years after the traffic is opened is hereby
cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway

APPENDICES 117

shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria
may lease or purchase the necessary land for erecting
suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for
prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3, Japanese subjects shall be free to reside
and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in busi-
ness and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in
the preceding two articles, besides being required to
register with the local authorities pass-ports which
they must procure under the existing regulations, shall
also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax
regulations, which are approved by the Japanese
consul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defend-
ants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by
the Japanese consul; those in which the defendants
are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese
Authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed
to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed
civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to
land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of
both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese
law and local usage. When the judicial system in
the said region is completely reformed, all civil and
criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be
tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese sub-
jects shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, se-
lect, and then prospect for and open mines at the fol-
lowing places in South Manchuria, apart from those

118 APPENDICES

mining areas in which mines are being prospected f ol
or worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely
settled methods at present in force shall be followed.

PROVINCE

OF FENG-TIEN

Locality District

Mineral

Niu Hsin T'ai

Pen-hsi

Coal

Tien Shih Fu Kou

Pen-hsi

((

Sha Sung Kang

Hai-l\ing

€€

T'ieh Ch'ang

T'ung-hua

€t

Nuan Ti T'ang

Chin

(€

An Shan Chan region

From Liao-yang

to Pen-hsi

Iron

PROVINCE OF KIRIN

{Southern portion)

Sha Sung Kang Ho-lung C. & I.

Kang Yao Chi-lin (Kirin) Coal

Chia P'i Kou Hua-tien Gold

Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that China will
hereafter provide funds for building railways in
South Manchuria; if foreign capital is required, the
Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for the loan
with Japanese capitalists first.
Article 5a, (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter,
when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of
the taxes of South Manchuria (not including customs
and salt revenue on the security of which loans have
already been made by the Central Government), it

APPENDICES 119

will negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists
first.

Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Grovemment declares that hereafter if
foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial,
military or police matters, are to be employed in South
Manchuria, Japanese will be employed first.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily
to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Chang-
chun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard
the provisions in railway loan agreements made here-
tofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in
future, more advantageous terms than those in exist-
ing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign
financiers, in connection with railway loans, the above
agreement shall again be revised in accordance with
Japan's wishes.

All existing treaties between China and Japan re-
lating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise pro-
vided for by this Convention, remain in force.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter
when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of
the taxes of Eastern Inner Mongolia, China must ne-
gotiate with the Japanese Government first.

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will
herself provide funds for building the railways in
Eastern Inner Mongolia ; if foreign capital is required,
she must negotiate with Japanese Government first.

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest
of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open
by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable
places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial

120 APPENDICES

Ports. The places which ought to be opened are to
be chosen, and the r^^ations are to be drafted, by
the Chinese Giovemment, but the Japanese Minister
must be consuhed before making a decision.

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring
jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and indus-
tries incidental thereto, the Chinese Grovemment shaH
give its permission.

GROUP III

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping
Company being very intimate, if those interested in
the said Company come to an agreement with the
Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the Chinese
Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto.
The Chinese Government further agrees that, with-
out the consent of the Japanese capitalists China will
not convert the Company into a state enterprise, nor
confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign
capital other than Japanese.

GROUP IV

China to give a pronouncement by herself in ac-
cordance with the following principle :

No bay, harbour, or island along the coast of China
may be ceded or leased to any Power.

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED

As regards the right of financing a railway from
Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang

APPENDICES 121

line, the Nanchang-Hangchow railway, and the Nan-
chang-Chaochow railway, if it is clearly ascertained
that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant
the said right to Japan.

B

As regards the right of financing a railway from
Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang
railway, a railway from Nanchang to Hangchow and
another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese
Government shall not grant the said right, to any
foreign Power before Japan comes to an understand-
ing with the other Power which is heretofore inter-
ested therein.

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation
whatever is to be permitted to construct, on the coast
of Fukien Province, a dock-yard, a coaling station for
military use, or a naval base; not to be authorised to
set up any other military establishment. The Chinese
Chinese Government further agrees not to use foreign
capital for setting up the above mentioned construc-
tion or establishment.

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign aflFairs, stated as
follows :

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in fu-
ture, it considers this step necessary, engage numerous
Japanese advisers.

2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire
to lease or purchase land in the interior of China for
establishing schools or hospitals, the Chinese Gov-

122 APPENDICES

emment shall forthwith give its consent thereto.
3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the

Chinese Government will send military officers to

Japan to negotiate with Japanese military authorities

the matter of purchasing arms or that of establishing

a joint arsenal.

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows :
As relates to the question of the right of missionary

propaganda, the same shall be taken up again for

negotiation in future.

APPENDIX E

china's reply to revised demands

China's Reply of May 1, 1915, to the Japanese Re-
vised Demands of April 26, 1915.

GROUP I

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Govern-
ment, being desirous of maintaining the general peace
in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly
relations and good neighbourhood existing between
the two nations agree to the following articles:

Article 1, The Chinese Government declare that
they will give full assent to all matters upon which
the Japanese and German Governments may hereafter
mutually agree, relating to the disposition of all in-
terests, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or re-
corded cases, possesses in relation to the Province of
Shantung.

The Japanese Government declare that when the
Chinese Government give their assent to the disposi-
tion of interests above referred to, Japan will restore
the leased territory of Kiaochow to China; and fur-
ther recognise the right of the Chinese Government to
participate in the negotiations referred to above be-
tween Japan and Germany.

Article 2, The Japanese Government consent to be
responsible for the indemnification of all losses occa-
sioned by Japan's military operation around the leased
territory of Kiaochow. The customs, telegraphs and

123

124 APPENDICES

post offices within the leased territory of Kiaochow
shall, prior to the restoration of the said leased terri-
tory to China, be administered as heretofore for the
time being. The railways and telegraph lines erected
by Japan for military purposes are to be removed
forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed out-
side the original leased territory of Kiaochow are now
to be withdrawn first, those within the original leased
territory are to be withdrawn on the restoration of
the said leased territory to China.

Article 3, (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declare that within the
Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory
or island will be ceded or leased to any Power tmder
any pretext.

Article 4, The Chinese Government consent that as
regards the railway to be built by China herself from
Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-
Tsinanfu railway, if Germany is willing to abandon
the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line,
China will approach Japanese capitalists for a loan.

Article 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by herself as soon as possible certain suitable
places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial
Ports.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes.)

The places which ought to be opened are to be
chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted by the
Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must
be consulted before making a decision.

Article 6. If the Japanese and German Govern-
ments are not able to come to a definite agreement in

APPENDICES 125

future in their negotiations respecting transfer, etc.,
this provisional agreement contained in the foregoing
articles shall be void.

GROUP II*

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Govern-
ment, with a view to developing their economic rela-
tions in South Manchuria agree to the following
articles :

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria
may, by arrangement with the owners, lease land re-
quired for erecting suitable buildings for trade and
manufacture or agriculture enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside
and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in busi-
ness and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3a, The Japanese subjects referred to in
the preceding two articles, besides being required to
register with the local authorities pass-ports which
they must procure under the existing regulations, shall
also observe police rules and regulations and pay taxes
in the same manner as Chinese. Civil and criminal
cases shall be tried and adjudicated by the authorities
of the defendant nationality and an officer can be
deputed to attend the proceedings. But all cases
purely between Japanese subjects and mixed cases
between Japanese and Chinese, relating to land or
disputes arising from lease contracts, shall be tried
and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities and the Japa-

♦Thc six articles which are found in Japan's Revised De-
mands of April 26, 1915, but omitted herein, are those already
initialled by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Japanese
Minister.

126 APPENDICES

nese Consul may also depute an officer to attend the
proceedings. When the judicial system in the said
Province is completely reformed, all the civil and
criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be
tried entirely by Chinese law courts.

RELATING TO EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

(To be Exchanged by Notes)

1. The Chinese Government declare that China will
not in future pledge the taxes, other than customs and
salt revenue of that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia
under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and Jehol
Intendency, as security for raising a foreign loan.

2. The Chinese Government declare that China will
herself provide funds for building the rail*ways in that
part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction
of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency ; if for-
eign capital is required, China will negotiate with
Japanese capitalists first, provided this does not conflict
with agreements already concluded with other Powers.

The Chinese Government agree, in the interest of
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by
China herself certain suitable places in that part of
Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of
South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, as Com-
mercial Marts.

The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will
be made in accordance with those of other Commer-
cial Marts opened by China herself.

GROUP m

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping
Company being very intimate, if the said Company

APPENDICES 127

comes to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists
for co-operation, the Chinese Government shall forth-
with give their consent thereto. The Chinese Govern-
ment further declare that China will not convert the
company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor
cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than
Japanese.

Letter to be addressed by the Japanese Minister to
the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Excellency : I have the honour to state that a report
has reached me that the Chinese Government have
given permission to foreign nation to construct, on
the coast of Fukien Province, dock yards, coaling sta-
tions for military use, naval bases and other establish-
ments for military purposes; and further, that the
Chinese Government are borrowing foreign capital for
putting up the above-mentioned constructions or estab-
lishments. I shall be much obliged if the Chinese
Government will inform me whether or not these re-
ports are well founded in fact.

Reply to be addressed by the Chinese Minister of
Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister.

Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge the

receipt of your Excellency's Note of . In reply

I beg to state that the Chinese Government have not
given permission to foreign Powers to construct, on
the coast of Fukien Province, dock yards, coaling sta-
tions for military use, naval bases or other establish-
ments for military purposes ; nor do they contemplate
to borrow foreign capital for putting up such con-
structions or establishments.

APPENDIX F

MEMORANDUM

Read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr.
Hioki, the Japanese Minister, at a Conference held at
Wai Chiao Pu, May 1, 1915.

The list of demands which the Japanese Govern-
ment first presented to the Chinese Government con-
sists of five groups, the first relating to Shantung, the
second relating to South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia, the third relating to Hanyehping
Company, the fourth asking for non alienation of the
coast of the country, and the fifth relating to the ques-
tions of national advisers, national police, national
arms, missionary propaganda, Yangtse Valley rail-
ways, and Fukien Province. Out of profound regard
for the intentions entertained by Japan, the Chinese .
Government took these momentous demands into
grave and careful consideration and decided to nego-
tiate with the Japanese Government frankly and sin-
cerely what were possible to negotiate. This is a mani-
festation to Japan of the most profound regard which
the Chinese Government entertains for the relations
between the two nations.

Ever since the opening of the negotiations China has
been doing her best to hasten their progress, holding
as many as three conferences a week. As regards the
articles in the second group, the Chinese Government,
being disposed to allow the Japanese Government to

128

APPENDICES 129

develop the economic relations of the two countries
in South Manchuria, realising that the Japanese Gov-
ernment attaches importance to its interests in that
region, and wishing to meet the hope of Japan, made
a painful eflFort, without hesitation, to agree to the
extension of the 25-year lease of Port Arthur and
Dalny, the 36-year period of the South Manchuria
railway and the 15-year period of the Antung-Mukden
railway, all to 99 years ; and to abandon its own cher-
ished hopes to regain control of these places and
properties at the expiration of their respective original
terms of lease. It cannot but be admitted that this
is a most genuine proof of China's friendship for
Japan.

As to the right of opening mines in South Man-
churia, the Chinese Government has already agreed to
permit Japanese to work mines within the mining area
designated by Japan. China has further agreed to
give Japan a right of preference in the event of bor-
rowing foreign capital for building railways or of
making a loan on the security of the local taxes in
South Manchuria. The question of revising the ar-
rangement for the Kirin-Changchun railway has been
settled in accordance with the proposal made by Japan.
The Chinese Government has further agreed to em-
ploy Japanese first in the event of employing foreign
advisers on political', military, financial and police
matters.

Furthermore, the provision about the repurchase
period in the South Manchurian railway was not men-
tioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently,
the Japanese Government alleging that its meaning

130 APPENDICES

was not clear, asked China to cancel the provision
altogether. Again, Japan at first demanded the right
of Japanese to carry on farming in South Manchuria,
but subsequently she considered the word "farming"
was not broad enough and asked to replace it with
the phrase "agricultural enterprises." To these re-
quests the Chinese Government, though well aware
that the proposed changes could only benefit Japan,
still acceded without delay. This, too, is a proof of
China's frankness and sincerity towards Japan.

As regards matters relating to Shantung the Chi-
nese Government has agreed to a majority of the de-
mands.

The question of inland residence in South Man-
churia is, in the opinion of the Chinese Government,
incompatible with the treaties China had entered into
with Japan and other Powers, still the Chinese Gov-
ernment did its best to consider how it was possible
to avoid that incompatibility. At first, China sug-
gested that the Chinese Authorities should have full
rights of jurisdiction over Japanese settlers. Japan
declined to agree to it. Thereupon China reconsidered
the question and revised her counter-proposal five or
six times, each time making some definite concession,
and went so far as to agree that all civil' and criminal
cases between Chinese and Japanese should be ar-
ranged according to existing treaties. Only cases re-
lating to land or lease contracts were reserved to be
adjudicated by Chinese Courts, as a mark of China's
sovereignty over the region. This is another proof
of China's readiness to concede as much as possible.

Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region

APPENDICES 131

as yet and the conditions existing there are entirely
different from those prevailing in South Manchuria.
The two places, therefore, cannot be considered in
the same light. Accordingly, China agreed to open
commercial marts first, in the interests of foreign
trade.

The Hanyehping Company mentioned in the third
group is entirely a private company, and the Chinese
Government is precluded from interfering with it and
negotiating with another government to make any dis-
posal' of the same as the Government likes, but having
regard for the interests of the Japanese capitalists the
Chinese Government agreed that whenever, in future
the said company and the Japanese capitalists should
arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for co-operation,
China will give her assent thereto. Thus the interests
of the Japanese capitalists are amply safeguarded.

Although the demand in the fourth group asking
for a declaration not to alienate China's coast is an
infringement of her sovereign rights, yet the Chinese
Government oflFered to make a voluntary pronounce-
ment so far as it comports with China's sovereign
rights. Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Government,
in deference to the wishes of Japan, gave a most seri-
ous consideration even to those demands which gravely
aflFect the sovereignty and territorial rights of China
as well as the principle of equal opportunity and the
treaties with foreign Powers. All this was a painful
effort on the part of the Chinese Government to meet
the situation — a, fact of which the Japanese Govern-
ment must be aware.

132 APPENDICES

As regard the demands in the fifth g^oup, they all
infringe China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other
Powers or the principle of equal opportunity. Al-
though Japan did not indicate any difference between
this group and the preceding four in the list which
she presented to China in respect of their character,
the Chinese Government, in view of their palpably
objectionable features, persuaded itself that these
could not have been intended by Japan as anything
other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accord-
ingly China has declared from the very beginning that
while she entertains the most profound regard for
Japan's wishes, she was unable to admit that any of
these matters could be made the subject of an xmder-
standing with Japan. Much as she desired to pay
regard to Japan's wishes, China cannot but respect her
own sovereign rights and the existing treaties with
other Powers. In order to be rid of the seed for
future misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis
of friendship, China was constrained to iterate the
reasons for refusing to negotiate on any of the articles
in the fifth group, yet in view of Japan's wishes China
has expressed her readiness to state that no foreign
money was borrowed to construct harbour work in
Fukien Province. Thus it is clear that China went
so far as to seek a solution for Japan of a question
that really did not admit of negotiation. Was there,
then, evasion, on the part of China?

Now, since the Japanese Government has presented
a revised list of demands and declared at the same,
time, that it will restore the leased territory of Kiao-

APPENDICES 133

chow, the Chinese Government reconsiders the whole
question and herewith submits a new reply to the
friendly Japanese Government.

In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group
are stated again for discussion.

As regards the second group, those articles which
have already been initialled are omitted. In connec-
tion with the question of inland residence the police
regulation clause has been revised in a more restric-
tive sense. As for the trial of cases relating to land
and lease contracts the Chinese Government now per-
mits the Japanese Consul to send an officer to attend
the proceedings.

Of the four demands in connection with that part
of Eastern Inner Mongolia which is within the juris-
diction of South Manchuria and the Jehol intendency,
China agrees to three.

China, also, agrees to the article relating to the
Hanyehping Company as revised by Japan.

It is hoped, that the Japanese Government will ap-
preciate the conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Govern-
ment in making this final concession and forthwith
give her assent thereto.

There is one more point. At the beginning of the
present negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe
secrecy but unfortunately a few days after the pres-
entation of the demands by Japan an Osaka news-
paper published an "Extra" giving the text of the
demands. The foreign and the Chinese press has
since been paying considerable attention to this ques-
tion and frequently publishing pro-Chinese or pro-
Japanese comments in order to call forth the World's

134 APPENDICES

conjecture — a matter which the Chinese Government
deeply regrets.

The Chinese Government has never carried on any
newspaper campaign and the Chinese Minister of
Foreign Affairs has repeatedly declared it to the Japa-
nese Minister.

In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to
express its hope that the negotiations now pending
between the two countries will soon come to an end
and whatever misgivings foreign countries entertain
toward the present situation may be quickly dispelled.

APPENDIX G

japan's ultimatum to china

Japan's Ultimatum delivered by the Japanese Min-
ister to the Chinese Government, on May 7th, 1915.

The reason why the Imperial Government opened
the present negotiations with the Chinese Government
is first to endeavour to dispose of the complications
arising out of the war between Japan and Germany,
and secondly to attempt to solve those various ques-
tions which are detrimental to the intimate relations
of China and Japan with a view to solidifying the
foundation of cordial' friendship subsisting between the
two countries to the end that the peace of the Far
East may be effectually and permanently preserved.
With this object in view, definite proposals were pre-
sented to the Chinese Government in January of this
year, and up to to-day as many as twenty-five confer-
ences have been held with the Chinese Government in
perfect sincerity and frankness.

In the course of the negotiation the Imperial Gov-
ernment have consistently explained the aims and ob-
jects of the proposals in a conciliatory spirit, while
on the other hand the proposals of the Chinese Gov-
ernment, whether important or unimportant, have been
attended to without any reserve.

It may be stated with confidence that no effort has
been spared to arrive at a satisfactory and amicable
settlement of those questions.

135

136 APPENDICES

The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals
was practically at an end at the twenty-fourth con-
ference; that is on 17th of the last month. The Im-
perial Government, taking a broad view of the nego-
tiation and in consideration of the points raised by
the Chinese Government, modified the original pro-
posals with considerable concessions and presented
to the Chinese Government on the 26th of the same
month the revised proposals for agreement, and at the
same time it was offered that, on the acceptance of
the revised proposals, the Imperial Government would,
at a suitable opportunity, restore, with fair and proper
conditions, to the Chinese Government the Kiaochow
territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial
Government had made a great sacrifice.

On the 1st of May, the Chinese Government de-
livered the reply to the revised proposals of the Japa-
nese Government, which is contrary to the expecta-
tions of the Imperial Government. The Chinese Gov-
ernment not only did not give a careful considera-
tion to the revised proposals but even with regard to
the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiao-
chow to the Chinese Government the latter did not
manifest the least appreciation for Japan's goodwill
and difficulties.

From the commercial and militaiy points of view
Kiaochow is an important place, in the acquisition of
which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and
money, and, after the acquisition the Empire incurs
no obligation to restore it to China. But with the
object of increasing the future friendly relations of the
two countries, they went to the extent of proposing

APPENDICES 137

its restoration, yet to her great regret, the Chinese
Government did not take into consideration the good
intention of Japan and manifest appreciation of her
difficulties. Furthermore, the Chinese Government not
only ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial Gov-
ernment in offering the restoration of Kiaochow Bay,
but also in replying to the revised proposals they even
demanded its unconditional restoration; and again
China demanded that Japan should bear the responsi-
bility of paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses
and damages resulting from Japan's military operations
at Kiaochow; and still further in connection with the
territory of Kiaochow China advanced other demands
and declared that she has the right of participation
at the future peace conference to be held between Japan
and Germany. Although China is fully aware that the
unconditional restoration of Kiaochow and Japan's
responsibility of indemnification for the unavoidable
losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan
yet she purposely advanced these demands and de-
clared that this reply was final and decisive.

Since Japan could not tolerate such demands the
settlement of the other questions, however compro-
mising it may be, would not be to her interest. The
consequence is that the present reply of the Chinese
Government is, on the whole, vague and meaningless.

Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Govern-
ment to the other proposals in the revised list of the
Imperial Government, such as South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particularly has
geographical, commercial, industrial and strategic rela-
tions, as recognised by all the nations, and made more

138 APPENDICES

remarkable in consequence of the two wars in which
Japan was engaged, the Chinese Government overlooks
these facts and does not respect Japan's position in that
place. The Chinese Government even freely altered
those articles which the Imperial Government, in a
compromising spirit, have formulated in accordance
with the statement of the Chinese Representatives
thereby making the statements of the Representatives
an empty talk; and on seeing them conceding with
the one hand and withholding with the other it is very
difficult to attribute faithfulness and sincerity to the
Chinese Authorities.

As regards the articles relating to the emplo)rment
of advisers, the establishment of schools and hospitals,
the supply of arms and ammuntion and the establish-
ment of arsenals and railway concessions in South
China in the revised proposals they were either pro-
posed with the proviso that the consent of the Power
concerned must be obtained, or they are merely to be
recorded in the minutes in accordance with the state-
ments of the Chinese delegates, and thus they are not
in the least in conflict either with Chinese sovereignty
or her treaties with the Foreign Powers, yet the
Chinese Government in their reply to the proposals,
alleging that these proposals are incompatible with
their sovereign rights and treaties with Foreign Pow-
ers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial Govern-
ment. However in spite of such attitude of the Chinese
Government, the Imperial Government, though regret-
ting to see that there is no room for further negotia-
tions, yet warmly attached to the preservation of the
peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a satisfac-

APPENDICES 139

toiy settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of
the relations.

So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no
patience, they have reconsidered the feelings of the
Government of their neighbouring Country and, with
the exception of the article relating to Fukien which
is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has
already been agreed upon by the Representatives of
both nations, will undertake to detach the Group V
from the present negotiation and discuss it separately
in the future. Therefore the Chinese Government
should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial
Government by immediately accepting without any al-
teration all the articles of Groups I, II, III, and IV
and the exchange of notes in connection with Fukien
province in Group V as contained in the revised pro-
posals presented on the 26th of April.

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their
advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon
this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock
P.M. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that
if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the
specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps
they may deem necessary.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Accompanying Ultimatum delivered to the MifAs-
ter of Foreign Affairs by the Japanese Minister, May
7th, 1915.

1. With the exception of the question of Fukien
to be arrangel by an exchange of notes, the five arti-
cles postponed for later negotiation refer to (a) the

140 APPENDICES

employment of advisers, (b) the establishment of
schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in
South Qiina, (d) the supply of arms and ammunition
and the establishment of arsenals, and (e) right of
Missionary propaganda.

2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of
the article relating to Fukien may be either in the
form as proposed by the Japanese Minister on the 26th
of April or in that contained in the Reply of the
Chinese Government of May 1st. Although the Ulti-
matum calls for the immediate acceptance by China
of the modified proposals presented on April 26th,
without alteration but it should be noted that it merely
states the principle and does not apply to this article
and articles 4 and 5 of this note.

3. If the Chinese Government accept all the arti-
cles as demanded in the Ultimatum the offer of the
Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to China
made on the 26th of April, will still hold good.

4. Article 2 of Group II relating to the lease or
purchase of land, the terms "lease" and "purchase"
may be replaced by the terms "temporary lease" and
"perpetual lease" or "lease on consultation," which
means a long-term lease with its unconditional re-
newal :

Article 4 of Group II relating to the approval of
Police laws and Ordinances and local taxes by the
Japanese Consul may form the subject of a secret
agreement.

5. The phrase "to consult with the Japanese Gov-
ernment" in connection with questions of pledging
the local taxes for raising loans and the loans for

APPENDICES il41

the construction of railways, in Eastern Inner Mon-
golia, which is similar to the agreement in Manchuria
relating to the matters of the same kind, may be re-
placed by the phrase "to consult with the Japanese
capitalists."

The article relating to the opening of trade marts
in Eastern Inner Mongolia in respect to location and
regulations, may, following the precedent set in Shan-
tung, be the subject of an exchange of notes.

6. From the phrase "those interested in the Com-
pany" in Group III of the revised list of demands,
the words "those interested in" may be deleted.

7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement
and its annexes shall be the official text or both the
Chinese and Japanese shall be the official texts.

APPENDIX H

REPLY OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO THE ULTI-
MATUM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, DELIVERED
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER BY THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE 8tH OF MAY, 1915

On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock p.m. the
Chinese Government received an Ultimatum from the
Japanese Government together with an Explanatory
Note of seven articles. The Ultimatum concluded with
the hope that the Chinese Government by six o'clock
P.M. on the 9th of May, will give a satisfactory reply,
and it is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply
is received before or at the specified time, the Japa-
nese Government will take steps she may deem neces-
sary.

The Chinese Government with a view to preserving
the peace of the Far East, hereby accepts, with the
exception of those five articles of Group V postponed
for later negotiation, all the articles of Groups I, II,
III and IV and the exchange of notes in connection
with the Fukien Province in Group V as contained in
the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April,
and in accordance with the Explanatory Note of seven
articles accompanying the Ultimatum of the Japa-
nese Government with the hope that thereby all the
outstanding questions are settled, so that the cordial
relationship between the two countries may be further

142

APPENDICES 143

consolidated. The Japanese Minister is hereby re-
quested to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to make the literary improvement of
the text and sign the Agreement as soon as possible.

146 APPENDICES

ment, though their views differed from those of the
Japanese Minister, yielded in all these respects to
his contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in
the negotiations. The objections of the Japanese Min-
ister to the customary recording and signing of the
minutes of each conference, which the Chinese Govern-
ment suggested as a necessary and advisable precau-
tion, as well as one calculated to facilitate future ref-
erence, were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese
Government retaliate in any way when in the course
of the negotiations the Japanese Minister twice sus-
pended the conferences, obviously with the object of
compelling compliance with his views on certain points
at the time under discussion. Even when delay was
threatened owing to the unfortunate injury sustained
by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall from
his horse, the Chinese delegates, in order to avert
interruption, proposed that the conferences should
be continued at the Japanese Legation, which proposal
was accepted. Later, when on March 22, the Japanese
Government despatched large bodies of troops to South
Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose
of relieving the garrison — ^whose term of service had
not then expired — the Japanese Minister stated at the
conference, in reply to a direct question as to when
the retiring troops would be withdrawn, that this would
not be done until the negotiations could be brought
to a satisfactory conclusion. Although this minatory
step caused much excitement, indignation and alarm
on the part of the Chinese people, and made it diffi-
cult for the Chinese Government to continue the con-
ferences, they successfully exerted efforts to avert a

\

APPENDICES .147

rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly
to proceed. All this demonstrates that the Chinese
Gk)vernment were dominated by a sincere desire to
expedite the progress of the conferences ; and that the
Japanese Grovernment recognised this important fact
was made clear on March 11 when the Japanese Min-
ister conveyed to the Chinese Government an expres-
sion of his Government's appreciation of China's
frankness and sincerity in the conduct of the negotia-
tions.

From February 2, when the negotiations were com-
menced, to April 17, twenty-four conferences were
held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese
Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an amica-
ble settlement and made every concession possible.

Of the twenty-one demands originally submitted by
Japan, China agreed to fifteen, some in principle and
some textually, six being initialled by both parties.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA

AGREED

At the first conference, held on February 2, China
agreed in principle to the first article of the Shantung
Group of demands which provides that China should
give her assent to the transfer of Germany's rights in
Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Government main-
tained at first that the subject of this demand related
to the post bellum settlement, and, therefore, should
be left over for discussion by all the parties interested
at the Peace Conference, Failing to persuade the Japa-
nese Minister to accept this view, the Chinese Gov-

148 APPENDICES

eminent agreed to this demand in principle, and made
certain supplementary proposals.

One of the supplementary proposals was in these
terms:

"The Japanese Government declares that when
the Chinese Government give their assent to the
disposition of the rights above referred to, Japan
will restore the Leased Territory of Kiaochow
to China, and further recognises the right of the
Chinese Government to participate in the nego-
tiations referred to above between Japan and
Germany."

The provision for a declaration to restore Kiaochow
was clearly not a demand on Japan but only a reitera-
tion of Japan's voluntary statement in her Ultimatum
to Germany on August 15, 1914, (a copy of which
was officially transmitted to the Chinese Government
for perusal on August 15), and repeated in public
statements by the Japanese Premier. Appreciating
the earnest desire of Japan to maintain the peace of
the Far East and to cement her friendship with China,
as evidenced by this friendly offer, the Chinese Gov-
ernment left the entire question of the conditions
of restoration to be determined by Japan, and refrained
from making any reference thereto in the supplemen-
tary proposal. The suggestion relating to participa-
tion in the Conference between Japan and Germany
was made in view of the fact that Shantung, the ob-
ject of future negotiation between Japan and Ger-
many, is a Chinese Province, and therefore China

APPENDICES [149

is the Power most concerned in the future of that
territory.

Another supplementary proposal suggesting the
assumption by Japan of responsibility for indemnifica-
tion of the losses arising out of the military operations
by Japan in and about the leased territory of Kiaochow
was necessitated by the fact that China was neutral
ms-^'vis the war between Japan and Germany. Had
China not inserted such a provision, her position in
relation to this conflict might have been liable to mis-
construction — ^the localities in which the operations
took place being a portion of China's territory — ^and
might also have exposed herself to a claim for in-
demnification of losses for which she was in no way
responsible.

In a further supplementary proposal the Chinese
Government suggested that, prior to the restoration
of the Kiaochow territory to China, the Maritime Cus-
toms, the telegraphs and post offices should be con-
tinued to be administered as heretofore ; that the mili-
tary railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were in-
stalled by Japan to facilitate her military operations,
should be removed forthwith ; that the Japanese troops
now stationed outside of the leased territory should
be first withdrawn, and those within the territory
should be recalled at the time when Kiaochow is re-
turned to China. Shantung being a Chinese Province,
it was natural for China to be anxious concerning the
restoration of the statu quo ante bellum. Although
the Chinese Government were confident that the Japa-
nese Government would effect such restoration in pur-
suance of their official declaration, it was necessary

150 APPENDICES

for China, being neutral throughout the war, to place
these matters on record.

At the third conference, held on February 22, China
agreed to the second demand in the Shantung Group
not to cede or lease to any Power any territory or
island or land on the sea border of Shantung.

At the fifth conference, held on February 28, China
agreed to give Japan the preference, provided Ger-
many abandoned the privilege, to supply the capital for
the construction of a railway from Chefoo or Lung-
kow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway,
in the event of China deciding to build that railway
with foreign capital.

At the sixth conference, held on March 3, China,
in the interests of foreign trade, agreed to open certain
important cities in Shantung as trade marts under
regulations approved by the Japanese Government,
although this was a demand on the part of Japan for
privileges additional to any that hitherto had been
enjoyed by Germany and was not an outcome of the
hostilities between Japan and Germany, nor, in the
opinion of the Chinese Government, was its acceptance
essential to the preservation of peace in the Far East

At the eighth conference, held on March 9, China
agreed (1) to the extension of the term of the lease
of Dairen and (2) Port Arthur, and (3) of the South
Manchuria and (4) Antung-Mukden railways, all to
ninety-nine years.

Owing to the bitter experiences which China sus-
tained in the past in connection with the leased por-
tions of her territory, it has become her settled policy
not to grant further leases nor to extend the term of

APPENDICES 151

those now in existence. Therefore, it was a significant
indication of China's desire to meet Japan's wishes
when she agreed to this exceptional departure from her
settled policy.

At the same conference the Chinese Government
also agreed to refrain from raising objections to the
principle of co-operation in the Hanyehping Company,
if the latter should arrive at an agreement in this re-
spect with the Japanese capitalists concerned. With
reference to this question it was pointed out to the
Japanese Minister that, in the Provisional Constitution
of the Republic of China, Chinese subjects are guar-
anteed the right of protection of their property and
freedom to engage in any lawful occupation. The
Government were precluded, therefore, from interfer-
ing with the private business of the people, and could
not find any other solution than the one thus agreed to.

As regards the single article of the Fourth Group,
and the preamble thereto, the Chinese Government held
that they were inconsistent with Chinese sovereignty.
However, China, at this conference, expressed her
readiness to meet the wishes of Japan so far as it was
possible without infringing her sovereignty, and agreed
to make a voluntary pronouncement that she would not
alienate any portion of her coast line.

In connection with the South Manchuria Railway it
is worthy of note that the provision regarding the re-
purchase period in the agreement (thirty-six years
from 1902) was not mentioned in Japan's original
proposal. Subsequently the Japanese Government, on
the ground that the meaning of this provision was not
clear, requested China to agree to its cancellation.

152 APPENDICES

To this request the Chinese Government acceded,
though well aware that the proposed change could only
benefit Japan. China thus relinquished the right to
repurchase the railway at the expiration of another
twenty-three years.

In connection with the Antung-Mukden Railway the
article, which was originally initialled at the confer-
ence, provided for the reversion of the railway to
China at the end of ninety-nine years without payment,
but, at the subsequent meeting, the Japanese Minister
requested that the reference to the reversion without
payment be deleted from the initialled article. In ac-
ceding to the Japanese Minister's request, China again
showed her sincere desire to expedite matters and to
meet Japan's wishes even at th sacrifice of a point
in her favour, to which Japan had already agreed.

At the eleventh conference, held on March 16, China
agreed to give Japan preference in regard to loans for
railway construction in South Manchuria.

At the thirteenth conference, held on March 23,
China agreed (1) to the amendment of the Kirin-
Changchun Railway loan agreement; (2) to give pref-
erence to Japan if the revenue of South Manchuria
were offered as security for loans; (3) to give pref-
erence to Japanese in the event of the employment of
advisers for South Manchuria; (4) to grant to Japa-
nese the right of mining in nine specified areas in
South Manchuria.

In its original form the demand with reference to
mining in South Manchuria tended to create a monop-
oly for Japanese subjects, and, therefore, was en-
tirely inconsistent with the principle of equal oppor-

APPENDICES 153

tunity. The Chinese Government explained that they
could not, in view of the treaty rights of other Pow-
ers, agree to this monopoly, but they readily gave
their acceptance when Japan consented to the modi-
fication of the demand so as to mitigate its monopolistic
character.

In connection with the Kirin-Changchun Railway
the amendment agreed to involves a fundamental revi-
sion of the original agreement on the basis of the
existing railway loan concluded by China with other
foreign capitalists, as well as an engagement on the
part of the Chinese Government to extend to this rail-
way any better terms which may be hereafter accorded
to other railway concessionaries in China. The cap-
ital of this railway was originally fifty per cent
Chinese and fifty per cent Japanese. The effect of this
undertaking is to transfer the capital originally held
by the Chinese, as well as the full control and ad-
ministration of the railway, to the Japanese.

At the twenty- first conference, held on April 10,
China agreed, in regard to the demands concerning
Fukien Province, to give Japan an assurance in ac-
cordance with Japan's wishes at a future time.

As regards demands 2 and 3 in the Manchurian
Group, relating to the ownership of land for trade,
manufacture, and agricultural enterprises as well as for
the right of settlement in the interior of South Man-
churia, the Chinese Government, after discussion at
several conferences, agreed to them in principle, but
desired to introduce certain amendments concerning the
control and protection of the Japanese subjects who
might avail themselves of these rights. The course of

154 APPENDICES

the negotiations in connection with these amendments
will be referred to subsequently.

IN THE MATTER OF THOSE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA

COULD NOT AGREE

Of the twenty-two original demands there were six,
as previously mentioned, to which China could not
agree on the ground that they were not proper sub-
jects for international negotiation, conflicting as they
did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights
of other Powers, and the principle of equal oppor-
tunity.

Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyeh-
ping question in the original Third Group in particu-
lar seriously affected the principle of equal commer-
cial and industrial opportunity.

The proposal that there should be joint administra-
tion by China and Japan of the police in China was
clearly an interference with the Republic's domestic
affairs, and consequently an infringement of her sover-
eignty. For that reason the Chinese Government could
not take the demand into consideration. But when it
was explained by the Japanese Minister that this re-
ferred only to South Manchuria, and he suggested that
his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to
engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory,
the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion.

The two articles relating to the acquisition of land
for schools, hospitals, and temples, as well as to thie
right of missionary propaganda, would, in the opinion
of the Chinese Government, have presented grave ob-
stacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling sub-

APPENDICES 155

sisting between the two people. The religions of the
two countries are identical and therefore the need for
a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China
by Japanese does not exist. The natural rivalry be-
tween Chinese and Japanese followers of the same
faith would tend to create incessant disputes and fric-
tion. Whereas Western missionaries live apart from
the Chinese communities among which they labour,
Japanese monks would live with the Chinese, and the
similarity of their physical characteristics, their reli-
gious garb, and their habits of life would render it
impossible to distinguish them for purposes of afford-
ing the protection which the Japanese Government
would require should be extended to them under the
system of extraterritoriality now obtaining in China.
Moreover, a general apprehension exists among the
Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favour-
ing conspiracies for political purposes might be taken
advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese.

The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze
Valley conflicted with the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo
Railway Agreement of March 6, 1908, the Nanking-
Changsha Railway Agreement of March 31, 1914, and
the engagement of August 24, 1914, giving prefer-
ence to British firms for the projected line from Nan-
chang to Chaochowfu. For this reason the Chinese
Government found themselves unable to consider the
demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed
of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly
pressed for its acceptance.

In respect to the demand for the appointment of
influential Japanese to be advisers in political, financial

156 APPENDICES

and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Gov-
ernment in r^ard to the appointment of advisers has
been similar to that which has presumably guided
the Japanese Government in like circumstances, namely
the selection of the best qualified men irrespective of
their nationality. As an indication of their desire to
avail themselves of the services of eminent Japanese,
one of the earliest appointments made to an adviser-
ship was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai
and Mr. Nakayama were appointed to the Ministry
of Communications.

It was considered that the demand that Japanese
should be appointed in the three most important admin-
istrative departments, as well as the demand for the
joint control of China's police, and the demand for
an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms
and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint ar-
senals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty
of the Republic that the Chinese Government were
unable even to consider them.

For these reasons the Chinese Government, at the
very outset of the negotiations, declared that they
were unable to negotiate on the demands ; but, in def-
erence to the wishes of the Japanese Minister, the
Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for de-
clining to enter into a discussion of them.

IN THE MATTER OF THE QUESTIONS OF DISPUTE
VOLVED IN SOME OF THE FOREGOING DEMANDS

The demand by Japan for the right of her subjects
in South Manchuria to lease or own land, and to reside
and travel, and to engage in business or manufacture

. APPENDICES 157

of any kind whatever was deemed by the Chinese Gov-
ernment to obtain for Japanese subjects in this region
a privileged status beyond the terms of the treaties
existing between the two nations, and to give them
a freedom of action which would be a restriction of
China's sovereignty and a serious infringement of her
administrative rights. Should Japanese subjects be
granted the right of owning land, it would mean that
all the landed property in the region might fall into
their hands, thereby endangering China's territorial
integrity. Moreover, residence in the interior was in-
compatible with the existence of extraterritoriality, the
relinquishment of which is necessary to the actual en-
joyment of the privilege of inland residence, as evi-
denced in practice of other nations.

Japan's unconditional demand for the privilege of
inland residence accompanied with a desire to extend
extraterritoriality into the interior of China and to
enable Japanese subjects to monopolise all the interests
in South Manchuria was also palpably irreconcilable
with the principle of equal opportunity. For this rea-
son the Chinese Government were, in the first instances,
unable to accept this demand as a basis of negotiation.
Their profound regard for the friendly relations of
the two countries, however, persuaded them to exert
their utmost efforts, in spite of all the inherent diffi-
culties, to seek a solution of a question which was prac-
tically impossible to solve. Knowing that the pro-
posal made by Japan was incompatible with treaties,
they nevertheless sought to meet her wishes within
the limits of treaties. Accordingly they submitted a
counter-proposal to open more places in South Man-

158 APPENDICES

churia to international trade and to establish Sino-
Japanese joint reclamation companies.

This suggestion was made in the belief that the
places to which Japanese subjects would desire to
resort for purposes of trade, could not be other than
important localities ; if all these localities were opened
to commerce, then they could reside, trade, and lease
land there for joint reclamation. Thus Japanese sub-
jects might enjoy the essence of the privilege of in-
land residence and would still be able to reconcile their
position with China's treaties and the principle of
equal opportunity.

After the Japanese Government declined to accept
this suggestion, China withdrew it and replaced it with
an amendment to the original articles. It was pro-
posed in this amendment to grant to Japanese sub-
jects the extra-treaty privilege of inland residence
with the provisos that Japanese subjects in places
outside of trade marts should observe Chinese police
regulations and pay taxes in the same manner as
Chinese; and that civil and criminal cases involving
such Japanese subjects should be adjudicated by
Chinese Authorities, the Japanese Consul attending
merely to watch the proceedings. This suggestion was
not an innovation: it was based upon the modus
operandi now in force as regards the Korean settlers
in inland districts in Chientao. But the Japanese Gov-
ernment again declined to accept it.

The Chinese Government thereupon made a third
proposal along the line of what constitutes the present
practice in Turkey, making a distinction, however,
in favour of Japanese subjects, in the exercise of

APPENDICES 159

jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. This was
once more objected to by the Japanese Government.

Then the Chinese Government proposed to concede
still another step — the fourth endeavour to meet
Japan's wishes. They proposed to agree to the full
text of Articles 2 and 3 relative to the question of in-
land residence, except that "the right of owning land*'
was changed into "the right of leasing land" and to
the phrase "cultivating land'* was added this clause:
"the regulations for whicK shall be determined sepa-
rately;" and, further, to add a supplementary article
which embodied a modus operandi which the Chinese
Government had constrained themselves to make out of
a desire to come to a settlement over this question.
The view advanced in this supplementary article was
based upon the Japanese Minister's declaration made
on March 6, 1915, that a separate article embodying
some compromise might be added to the original arti-
cles 2 and 3 for the purpose of avoiding any conflict
with China's sovereignty or the system established
by treaties.

These suggestions made by the Chinese Government
were not accepted by Japan.

As regards Eastern Inner Mongolia not only have
no treaties been entered into with Japan concerning
this region, but also the people are so unaccustomed
to foreign trade that the Chinese Government invaria-
bly feel much anxiety about the safety of foreigners
who elect to travel there. The Chinese Government,
therefore, considered that it would not be in the inter-
est of foreigners to open the whole territory to them
for residence and commerce, and on these grounds
based their original refusal to place Eastern Iimer

160 APPENDICES

Mongolia on the same footing as South Manchuria.
Still, their desire to meet the wishes of the Japa-
nese Government eventually prompted them to offer
to open a ntmiber of places in the region to foreign
trade.

IN THE MATTER OF JAPAN's REVISED DEMANDS

The foregoing is an outline of the negotiations up to
April 17. It was hoped by the Chinese Government
that the Japanese Government in view of the great
concessions made by China at the conferences held up
to this time, would see a way of effecting an amicable
settlement by modifying their position on certain points.
In regard to these it had, by this time, become mani-
fest that China would encounter almost insuperable
difficulties in making further concessions.

The Japanese Government, however, suspended the
negotiations imtil April 26, when they surprised the
Chinese Government by presenting a new list of
twenty- four demands (which is hereto appended), and
requested the Chinese Government to accord their ac-
ceptance without delay, adding that this was their final
proposal. At the same time the Japanese Minister
stated that the Japanese Government would restore the
leased territory of Kiaochow to China at an opportune
time in the future and under proper conditions, if the
Chinese Government would agree to the new list of
twenty-four demands without modification.

In this new list although the term "special position"
in the preamble of the Manchurian Group was changed
to "economic relations," and although the character of
the articles in the original Fifth Group was altered
from Demands to a recital of alleged statements by the

APPENDICES 161

Chinese Foreign Minister, four new demands were in-
troduced concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia. In def-
erence to the wishes of the Japanese Government, the
Chinese Government gave the revised list the most
careful consideration; and being sincerely desirous of
an early settlement offered new concessions in their
reply presented to the Japanese Minister on May 1.

In this reply the Chinese Government reinserted the
proposal in reference to the retrocession of Kiaochow
which they advanced at the first conference on Febru-
ary 2, and which was postponed at the request of the
Japanese Minister. This, therefore, was in no sense a
new proposal.

The Chinese Government also proposed to agree to
three of the four articles relating to Eastern Inner
Mongolia. There was some difficulty in determining
a definition of the boundaries of Eastern Inner Mon-
golia — this being a new expression in Chinese geo-
graphical terminology — ^but the Chinese Government,
acting upon a statement made at a previous conference
by the Japanese Minister that the Japanese Govern-
ment meant the region under Chinese administrative
jurisdiction, and taking note, in the list presented by
the Japanese Minister, of the names of places in East-
em Inner Mongolia to be opened to trade, inferred
that the so-called Eastern Inner Mongolia is that part
of Inner Mongolia which is tmder the jurisdiction of
South Manchuria and the Jehol circuit ; and refrained
from placing any limitations upon the definition of this
term.

The Chinese Government also withdrew their sup-
plementary proposal reserving the right of making
regulations for agricultural enterprises to be under-

162 APPENDICES

taken by Japanese settlers in South Manchuria.

In respect of the trial of cases involving land dis-
putes between Japanese only, or between Japanese and.
Chinese, the Chinese Government accorded to the
Japanese Consul the right to deputing an officer to
watch the proceedings^

The Chinese Government also agreed to accept the
suggestion of the Japanese Government to modify the
term **police law and ordinances" into "police rules
and regulations," thereby limiting the extent of con-
trol which the Chinese would have over Japanese
subjects.

As regards the Hanyehping demand, the Chinese
Government accepted the draft made by the Japanese
Government, embodying an engagement by the Chinese
Government not to convert the Company into a State-
owned concern, nor to cofiscate it, or to force it to
borrow foreign capital other than Japanese.

In respect of the Fukien question the Chinese
Government also agreed to give an assurance in the
amplified form suggested by the Japanese Govern-
ment that the Chinese Government had not given their
consent to any foreign nations to construct a dock-
yard, or a coaling station, or a naval base, or any other
military establishment along the coast of Fukien Prov-
ince ; nor did they contemplate borrowing foreign capi-
tal for the foregoing purposes.

Having made these concessions which practically
brought the views of China into line with those of
Japan, and having explained in a note accompanjring
the reply the difficulty for China to make further con-
cessions, the Chinese Government hoped that the Japa-
nese Government would accept their reply of May 1,

APPENDICES il63

and thus bring the negotiations to an amicable con-
clusion.

The Japanese Government, however, expressed
themselves as being dissatisfied with China's reply, and
withdrew the conditional offer to restore Kiaochow to
China made on April 26. It was further intimated
that if the Chinese Government did not give their full
compliance with the list of twenty- four demands, Japan
would have recourse to drastic measures.

Upon receiving this intimation the Chinese Govern-
ment, inspired by the conciliator)r*spirit which had been
predominant from the very beginning of the negotia-
tions and desirous of avoiding any possible rupture in
the relations of the two countries, made a supreme
effort to meet the situation, and represented to the
Japanese Government that they would reconsider their
position and make another attempt to find a solution
that would be more satisfactory to Japan, in respect
to those articles which China had declared could not
be taken up for consideration, but to which Japan
attached great importance. Even in the evening of
May 6, after the Japanese Minister had notified the
Chinese Government that the Ultimatum had arrived
in Peking, the Chinese Government in the interests of
peace still exerted efforts to save the situation by offer-
ing to meet Japan's wishes.

These overtures were again rejected, and thus was
exhausted the means at the disposal of the Chinese
Government to prevent an impasse.

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded
to the fullest extent of possible concession in view of
the strong national sentiment manifested by the people
throughout the whole period of negotiations. All that

164 APPENDICES

the Chinese Government strove to maintain was
China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of for-
eign Powers in China and the principle of equal oppor-
tunity. , _ ,, ^

To the profound regret of the Chinese Government
however, the tremendous sacrifices which they had
shown themselves ready to make, proved tmavailing,
and an Ultimatum was duly delivered to them by the
Japanese Minister at three o'clcok on the afternoon
of May 7.

As to the allegations made in the Ultimatum against
China the Chinese Government hope that the fore-
going outline of the history of the negotiations consti-
tutes a clear, dispassionate, and complete reply.

In considering the nature of the course they shotdd
take with reference to the Ultimatum the Chinese Gov-
ernment was influenced by a desire to preserve the
Chinese people, as well as the large number of foreign
residents in China, from unnecessary suffering and
also to prevent the interest^ of friendly Powers from
being imperilled. For these reasons the Chinese Gov-
ernment were constrained to comply in full with the
terms of the Ultimatum, but in complying the Chinese
Government disclaim any desire to associate themselves
with any revision, which may thus be effected, of the
various conventions and agreements concluded be-
tween other Powers in respect of the maintenance of
China's territorial independence and integrity, the
preservation of the status quo, and the principle of
equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all
nations in China.

APPENDIX J

japan's communique

Issued by the Japanese Government from Tokio on
May 7 and circulated by Reuter^s Telegraph Agency.

The Imperial Government have, in the demands
lately presented to the Chinese Government, made it
the main object to adjust matters to meet the new
situation created by the war between Japan and Ger-
many and to bring closer the friendly relations sub-
sisting between Japan and China and thus ensure the
permanent peace of the Far East. In formulating
these demands, they have taken special care to avoid
those which might have been deemed to conflict with
the principles of territorial integrity, equal opportunity
and the Open Door, which Japan has, from time to
time, declared to the Powers in regard to China. Ac-
cordingly these demands include among others those
relating to the disposition of German rights in Shan-
tung, those relating to the recognition of the special
position and interests of Japan in South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and those relating to the
solution of various questions which for many years
have been pending between the Japanese and Chinese
Governments.

Group I contains demands relating to the Province
of Shantung.

The first article demands an engagement on the part

165

166 APPENDICES

of China to consent to all matters which may be agreed
upon between the Japanese Government and the Ger-
man Government with regard to the disposition of all
rights, interests and concessions which in virtue of
treaties or otherwise Germany possesses in relation
to the Province of Shantimg.

The second article demands an engagement on the
part of China not to alienate or lease to another Power
the province of Shantung or any portion of it or any
island lying near tlie coast of the said province.

Article 3, China shall grant to Japan the right of
construction of a railway connecting Chefoo or Lung-
kou with the Tsinanfu-Kiaochow Railway.

Article 4, The Chinese Government shall open the
principal cities of the Province of Shantung for the
residence and trade of foreigners.

Group II. Contains demands relating to South
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. The first
article demands the extension of the terms of lease
of Port Arthur and of the South Manchuria and
Antung-Mukden railways to a period of ninety-nine
years. The second article demands that Japanese sub-
jects shall be permitted to lease or own land necessary
either for erecting buildings of various kinds for com-
mercial and industrial uses or for agricultural pur-
poses. The third article demands that Japanese sub-
jects shall be permitted to reside, travel and carry on
business of various kinds, commercial, industrial or
otherwise. The fourth article demands that Japanese
subjects shall be granted the mining rights of certain
specified mines. The fifth article demands that the
consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained

APPENDICES 167

in advance when China proposes to grant a railway
concession to subjects of a third Power or to procure
a supply of capital from a third Power for the con-
struction of a railway or to raise a loan from such
Power on the security of duties or taxes. The sixth
article demands that the Japanese Government shall be
consulted before the engaging of advisers or instructors
regarding political, financial or military matters. Arti-
cle 7 demands that the management and control of
the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be transferred to
Japan for the term of ninety-nine years.

Group III. Contains demands relating to the Han-
yehping Company. The first article demands that hav-
ing regard to the close relations between Japanese
capitalists and this Company, the Chinese Government
shall agree to the placing of the Company under joint
Japanese and Chinese management and not to dispose
or permit the Company to dispose, without the second
article demands that owing to the necessity for the
protection of the interests of Japanese capitalists, the
Chinese Government shall engage not to permit, with-
out the consent of the Company, any one other than
the Company to work mines situated in the neighbor-
hood of those belonging to the Company and also to
obtain previous consent in case it is proposed to take
measures which may be deemed to affect the Com-
pany directly or indirectly.

Group IV. Contains demands relating to the non-
alienation of the coast of China or islands off the coast.
The Chinese Government shall engage not to alienate
or lease to a third Power any ports or bays on, or
islands off, the coast of China.

168 APPENDICES

Group V. Propositions relating to the solution of
pending questions and others.

Article 1. The Central Chinese Government must
engage influential Japanese as political, financial and
military advisers.

Article 2. The Chinese Government must recognise
the right of Japanese to land for building Japanese
hospitals, temples and schools in the interior of China.

Article 3. The police in localities where such ar-
rangements are necessary must be placed under joint
Japanese and Chinese administration, or else Japanese
must be employed as police officers in such localities.

Article 4. China must obtain from Japan a supply
of a certain quantity of arms, or else must establish
arsenals in China, under joint Japanese and Chinese
management, and these must be supplied with experts
and material from Japan.

Article 5. Japan must be given the right to con-
struct a railway connecting Wuchang with the
Kiukiang-Nanchang line and with the Nanchang-
Hangchow railways.

Article 6. In view of the relations between the
province of Fukien and Formosa and the agreement
respecting the non-alienation of Fukien, Japan must
consulted whenever foreign capital is needed in con-
nection with railways, mines and harbour works, in-
cluding dockyards.

Article 7. The Chinese Government must recognise
the right of preaching by the Japanese in China.

With regard to the province of Shantung, China
absolutely lacks, it is clear, in her present condition,
the power to prevent Germany from recovering her

lb.

APPENDICES 169

influence in that province and from becoming in fu-
ture again a source of disturbance in the Far East.
It is, therefore, natural that Japan, who has at great
sacrifice driven Germany out of Shantung, should pre-
sent the above mentioned demands, in order to con-
sider how the rights possessed by Germany should be
disposed of, and to take measures to prevent the re-
crudescence of German influence.

Japan's relations with Manchuria have always been
especially close geographically, politically and from
the point of view of commercial and industrial inter-
ests. Since those relations have been strengthened
by two successive wars the predominant position of
Japan in that region has been recognised both at home
and abroad.

The case is almost similar in regard to Eastern
Inner Mongolia. Further, for the advancement of the
intimate relations existing between Japan and China,
no eflFort should be spared to solve definitely on this
occasion all pending questions which are likely to lead
to difficulties with China and at the same time to
make an agreement with a view to prevent future
misunderstandings. The Japanese Government, fully
expecting that the Chinese Government would value
the friendly sentiments existing between the two coun-
tries and willingly accede to the Japanese proposals,
urged them to carry these matters into effect, whereas,
in other matters China's consent was demanded by
reason of treaty and other rights.

With regard to the demands, which were formu-
lated after careful and mature consideration, on the
basis of the principles above referred to the Chinese

170 APPENDICES

Government, in disregard of the understanding which
was made at the commencement of the negotiations
to keep the proceedings of the conferences strictly
secret, made public the Japanese proposals, in various
exaggerated forms and endeavoured to stir up the
feelings of the Powers against Japan. They caused
the matters discussed at the conferences to be pub-
lished invariably in the newspapers, with a view to
hindering the progress of the negotiations; by fabri-
cating news detrimental to Japan and they attempted
to shake the confidence placed by her ally in Japan.
They even demanded the unconditional retrocession
of Kiaochow and an indemnity for the damage caused
by the war between Japan and Germany, and thus
they showed from the first a lack of a sincere desire
for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations.
Moreover, although the Japanese Government fully
showed its sincerity by repeatedly explaining the mo-
tives of the demands and endeavoured to hear China's
unreserved views on the matter, it is an undeniable
fact that the Chinese authorities failed to appreciate
the friendly attitude of Japan and persisted in pro-
tracting the negotiations. Twenty-five conferences
were held in all, extending over more than three
months and throughout these conferences the Japa-
nese Government exhausted every means of arriving
at a satisfactory solution, but the Chinese Govern-
ment, although they showed a disposition to agree to
the demands relating to the province of Shantung, yet
with regard to South Manchuria put various restric-
tions upon the most important demands, namely those

APPENDICES 1171

relating to the rights regarding land tenure and ob-
jected to those relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia
and various questions enumerated under Group V., on
the ground that they were derogatory to the sovereign
rights of China or conflicted with treaties with other
Powers and, although the Japanese Minister explained
that such was not the case, they refused to listen.
But, recognising that a satisfactory conclusion of the
negotiations was most important for the maintenance
of peace of the Far East, the Japanese Cjovemment
treated the Chinese contentions with every considera-
tion, making very great concessions. In a spirit of
conciliation they amended their proposals and pre-
sented their revised draft to the Chinese Government
on April 26. In the revised draft the contentions put
forward by the Chinese Cjovemment were taken into
consideration. In this draft, as regards Eastern Inner
Mongolia, the demands were confined, for the present,
to absolutely necessary matters; those relating to the
Hanyehping Company were confined to matters which
had been admitted by the Chinese Government at the
conferences. As regards the demand respecting the
non-alienation of the coast, the form desired by the
Chinese was accepted. The proposals relating to ad-
visers ownership of land for schools and hospitals,
and the position of the province of Fukien were all
altered in accordance with the views expressed by the
Chinese representatives at the conferences. As re-
gards South China rail*ways, the relations with third
parties especially were respected and alterations were
made accordingly. The question of the right of

172 APPENDICES

preaching was reserved for future negotiation. Those
relating to police and the ownership of sites for tem-
ples were withdrawn.

MORE ARTICLES ADDED IN REVISED DRAFT

The revised draft is therefore practically as fol-
lows :

Group II. Eastern Inner Mongolia is excluded
from the proposals respecting South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia and the second and third
articles are amended as follows :

Article 2. Japanese subjects shall be permitted in
the region of South Manchuria to lease or buy land
necessary for erecting buildings of various kinds for
commercial and industrial uses or for agricultural
purposes.

Article 3, Japanese subjects shall have liberty to
enter, travel and reside in the region of South Man-
churia and carry on business of various kinds, com-
mercial, and industrial, and otherwise.

The fourth article, referring to the preceding two
provisions, says that Japanese subjects shall produce
before the Chinese local' authorities passports duly
issued and registered by the said authorities. They
shall also observe Chinese police laws or regulations
approved by the Japanese consuls and pay to the
Chinese authorities taxes approved by the Japanese
consuls. In civil, original suits the Japanese consul,
where a Japanese subject is defendant, and a Chi-
nese official, where a Chinese is defendant, shall re-
spectively try and decide the case, both the Japanese
consul and the Chinese official being permitted each to

APPENDICES 173

send an authorised agent to attend the trial and watch
proceedings, provided that in a civil suit concerning
land between Japanese and Qiinese the case shall be
examined and decided jointly by the Japanese consul
and a Chinese official according to the laws and cus-
toms of China, provided further that in future when
the judicial system in the said region shall be com-
pletely reformed all civil and criminal suits involving
Japanese subjects shall be wholly tried and decided by
Chinese courts.

Proposals relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia :

The first article demands that China shall permit
joint enterprises of Japanese and Chinese in agricul-
tural and auxiliary industries, the second that China
shall consult Japan first in case China contemplates
contracting either railway loans or loans secured by
taxes, and the third that China shall increase the num-
ber of open marts.

Group III. As regards the Hanyehping Company
the Chinese Government shall engage to approve of
an agreement that may be concluded in future between
the Company and Japanese capitalists for a joint un-
dertaking, and agrees not to confiscate it nor to na-
tionalise it without the consent of interested Japanese
capitalists and not to permit it to contract any foreign
loan with other than Japanese.

Group IV. As regards the non-alienation of Chi-
nese coasts, the Japanese Gk)vemment will be satis-
fied with the declaration as suggested by the Chinese
Government.

Group V. As to the other points the following shall
be kept on record:

174 APPENDICES

Article 1. That the Chinese Government will in
case of necessity in future employ Japanese advisers.

Article 2, In case Japanese subjects desire to lease
or purchase land for the purpose of building schools
or hospitals in the interior, the Chinese Government
will permit theiji to do so.

Article 3. The Chinese Government will some day
in the future send military officers to Japan in order
to make arrangements directly with the Japanese mili-
tary authorities either for the purchase of arms from
Japan or for establishing an arsenal' ( ? arsenals) in
China under Sino-Japanese management.

Article 4. The Chinese Government will grant
Japan her desired railway concession in South China
in case it becomes clear that there is no objection in
this respect on the part of any other Power, or that
the Chinese Government will refrain from entering
into any agreement with any other party concerning
the railway lines in question until Japan may, inde-
pendently of the present negotiations with China,
reach an agreement with the party whose interests, in
the opinion of the Chinese Government, are opposed
to the proposed lines.

Article 5. The question of freedom for preaching
by Japanese missionaries will be left over for future
discussion.

The proposal for joint administration of police is
withdrawn.

As to Fukien province the Chinese Gk)vemment
must engage in some form that they will not grant to
any other Power the right to build a shipyard, coaling
or naval stations, or any other military establishment

APPENDICES 175

on or along the coast of Fukien province, and further,
that the Chinese Government will not allow any such
establishment to be built with any foreign capital on
the coast of the said province.

At the same time as to the presentation of the re-
vised draft, the Japanese Government declared to the
Chinese Government that if, at any peace conference
upon the conclusion of the present war, Japan should
be given the free disposal of Kiaochow which she ac-
quired at enormous sacrifice, she would return it to
China subject to certain conditions, of which the prin-
cipal ones were as follows:

The opening of Kiaochow Bay as a commercial
port.

The establishment of a Japanese concession in a
locality designated by the Japanese.

The establishment, if required by the Powers, of
an international settlement and arrangements between
the Japanese and Chinese Governments regarding the
disposal of the German public structures and prop-
erties.

Germany having after many years labour and heavy
expenditure of money converted Kiaochow into an
important military and commercial port, as the basis
of her expansion in the East, German influence in this
part of China grew with the development of Kiaochow
and became so firmly established that it was utterly
hopeless for China, single-handed, to regain posses-
sion of the leased territory. Japan, desiring to re-
move this source of danger, which might in future
again disturb the peace of the Far East, captured it
at no small cost of life and money, and now that it